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PURITAN REVOLUTION AND THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS
C. Scott Pryort and Glenn M. Hoshauertt
ARTICLE ABSTRACT
The revolutionary political, economic, and religious changes in England
from the time of Henry VIII through the execution of Charles I accompanied
the creation of the modern law of contracts. Most legal historians have ig-
nored the impact of the Protestant Reformation and the rise of Puritanism on
the development of the common law. Only a few historians have considered
the influence of Puritanism on the law but have come to conflicting conclu-
sions. This paper considers the question of Puritanism's impact on three as-
pects of the common law of contracts: the rise of the writ of assumpsit, the
rationalization of the doctrine of consideration, and the independence of
promissory conditions. The Authors conclude that Puritan theology was irrel-
evant to assumpsit and consideration but could have influenced the frame-
work of analysis of the application of virtually absolute liability in Paradine v.
Jane. 1
Second, the Puritan emphasis on discipline-personal, social, and ecclesias-
tical-represents an independent source of influence on the development of
the common law of contracts. The disciplined life grew in cultural significance
with the Reformation and the subsequent process of confessionalization. Of
the three confessional traditions arising from the Reformation, the Reformed,
which included the Puritans, implemented discipline to the greatest extent.
The Puritan tools of discipline-self-examination, literacy, catechizing, and
local ecclesiastical implementation-proved effective. The emerging modern
state valued a disciplined citizenry and eventually co-opted the social gains
produced by Puritanism. The particular forms of Puritan theology and disci-
pline were contributing factors to the English Civil War. The Civil War both
precipitated the monopolization of judicial power in the common law courts
and exacerbated the need for the imposition of social order from above.
These factors also underlay the decision in Paradine v. Jane.2 Thus, the Au-
thors believe that Puritan social practice influenced the common law of
contracts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
England experienced significant changes in at least four areas dur-
ing the century before the execution of Charles I in 1649. Notable
changes occurred in the common law of contracts, England's political
topography, its principal mode of economic activity, and its religious
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landscape. With respect to the law of contracts,3 three subjects of
transformation stand out as most significant: development of a new
form of action to vindicate contract claims, the creation and rationali-
zation of a new doctrine of consideration, and the ever-increasing
treatment of promises as absolute obligations. From early in the six-
teenth century, the writ of assumpsit increased in usefulness until it
became a commonplace writ for contract cases by the early years of
the next century. In the 1530s, a knowledgeable observer might have
confused consideration for civil law causa. Within a few years, the
contours of consideration in assumpsit had changed from a tool for
redress for injury to the promisee to vindication of the promisor's ex-
pectation. So, too, a party's duty to perform a promise, which might
have been discharged for several reasons in the sixteenth century, was
virtually absolute one hundred years later.
Second, radical political change marked the era beginning with
Henry VIII and ending with the execution of his distant nephew,
Charles I. Following the turmoil of the fifteenth century, the strong
Tudor monarchs actively pressed for the expansion of the royal pre-
rogative.4 The nobility, still greatly reduced from the War of the
Roses, was in no position to oppose Tudor aggrandizement. For over
half of the sixteenth century, a population anxious for political stabil-
ity acquiesced. A constitutional crisis began to grow during the latter
years of the reign of Elizabeth and reached crisis proportions during
the Stuart monarchy. The end of this study will see the complete re-
versal of Henry's efforts. Rather than a strong King-in-Parliament,
there will exist a Parliament without a king-a constitutional revolu-
tion. The ideological resources for England's constitutional revolu-
tion came from a working combination of Puritans with their
ecclesiology and covenant theology together with the common law-
yers with their ancient law.5
3. Reference to generic contracts for this period in English history bears the risk
of ambiguity. The historically correct referent of the writ of debt sur contract is too
narrow to capture my intent, and the modern concept of contracts is anachronistic.
For purposes of my introduction, and with a nod to the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, I intend "contract" to mean those claims cognizable at common law for
failure to keep one's promise. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1
(1981) ("A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a
duty.").
4. See LEWIS W. SPITZ, THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION 1517-1559, at 249
(1985) ("England had emerged from the ruinous civil War of the Roses only a few
years before, thanks to the strong arm of Henry VII.").
5. "In appealing to precedents that limited the arbitrary power of the king, the
Puritans could look to the support of the common lawyers, including many who were
by no means sympathetic with the Puritan cause as such." Harold J. Berman, Relig-
ious Foundations of Law in the West: A Historical Perspective, 1 J.L. & RELIGION 3, 33
(1983).
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Third, substantial economic changes also characterized a period
that historians have described as England's first industrial revolution. 6
The dissolution of the monasteries in 1536 enriched Henry. His subse-
quent sales of the monasteries' property enriched the growing non-
noble gentry who, in turn, adopted new agricultural efficiencies which
led to enclosures and subsequent rural depopulation. A rise in num-
bers of the urban poor quickly followed. Continued expansion of the
commercial, mercantile, and industrial middle class took place after
1540. 7 The medieval patrimonial social order was giving way to mod-
ern liberalism. Following nearly two centuries of disruptions marked
by plague and civil war, the pace at which contract replaced feudal
status increased. With the rise to power of a new class, a much freer
market economy would come to dominate the production and control
of wealth in England.
Finally, substantial religious change also marked this long century
of changes. While Henry broke with papal jurisdiction over the
Church in England in 1531, early Tudor reforms of doctrine were lim-
ited. Henry sought no changes of internal ecclesiastical structure or
practice.8 His occasional tendencies toward Lutheranism never ma-
tured, and Henry died committed to substantially all of received Cath-
olic dogma.9 With the accession of Edward VI in 1547 and Elizabeth I
in 1558 and for the balance of the century, a more distinctively Re-
formed or Calvinistic form of Protestantism gradually took hold in the
Church of England.1" Yet, during the Stuart monarchies in the seven-
teenth century, the tenor of the Church of England became less satis-
factory both theologically and in practical administration to many
known as Puritans. Thus, by 1642, Anglicanism and all England were
convulsed with a civil war in which both king and bishop were de-
6. See generally CHRISTOPHER HILL, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM IN PRE-REVOLU-
TIONARY ENGLAND 99-117 (St. Martin's Press 1997) (1958) [hereinafter HILL, SOCI-
ETY AND PURITANISM] (devoting a chapter to the problem of labor and industry
during this period).
7. See generally R. H. Britnell, The English Economy and the Government,
1450-1550, in THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES? 89 (1998) (discussing slow develop-
ment of the English economy until the 1540s and the sale of monastic estates).
8. Steady-state ecclesiology must be distinguished from Henry's position on the
monasteries. Henry made no change to the formal structure of the Church of En-
gland except to substitute himself as its civil head. See, e.g., A.G. DICKENS, THE EN-
GLISH REFORMATION 333-35 (1964).
9. As noted by Spitz:
[In 1540 Henry] present[ed] to Parliament ... the Six Articles Act. It was
truly Henry's own, for he revised the initial draft himself and sat in on the
debate in the House of Lords. The Six Articles reverted to (1) a Catholic
definition of transubstantiation in the sacrament; (2) celibacy of the clergy as
a divine order; (3) the binding character of the oaths of regular clergy; (4)
communion under one kind; (5) the appropriateness and necessity of private
masses; and (6) private confession.
SPITZ, supra note 4, at 267.
10. See id. at 278 ("Elizabeth had an exclusively Protestant council, men theologi-
cally more Protestant than she and some even favorable to Puritanism.").
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posed. A hierarchical Church rooted in the Middle Ages and cen-
tered on the administration of grace through the sacraments was
(nearly) replaced by a Church (or churches) focused on self-govern-
ance, preaching, and-most importantly-discipline.
That the political and religious changes discussed above were subse-
quently partially reversed should not obscure the long-term signifi-
cance of these areas of transformation. The Restoration of Charles II
in 1660 did not re-establish a king with political powers like those of
his Tudor and Stuart ancestors. A new constitutional order was con-
firmed. Even re-establishment of the Church of England restored an
ecclesial body in which tempered Puritan religious ideas had become
commonplace. With respect to legal and economic changes, the Res-
toration only accelerated what had preceded it.
Articulation of a relationship between legal, political, economic,
and religious changes in early modern English history is not new. Pu-
ritan apologists of the seventeenth century were quick to read the
hand of divine Providence in at least the constitutional changes of this
era. Yet, with the Restoration, what had been the hand of God was
considered to have been a great rebellion and formally ignored as
"nonhistory."'1 Over two hundred years later, the early twentieth
century sociologist Max Weber suggested there was a close relation-
ship between England's nascent capitalism and developing Puritan
theology. 2 A few decades later, R.H. Tawney gave priority of place
to material changes in the means of production and asserted that it
was economic changes, exemplified by capitalism, which transformed
the epiphenomenum of religion as well as public and private law. 3
With respect to the role of religion in history, some in contemporary
academic circles still exhibit the attitude that law professor Stephen
Carter describes as the trivialization of religious belief. 4 This trivial-
ization may carry over to the subjects of historical research so that
religious motives are downplayed in favor of geo-political or economic
factors. Other contemporary historians exhibit a finely nuanced ap-
proach, acknowledging the simultaneous reciprocal interplay of multi-
ple factors for changes in law and religion.1 5 Religion, then, is one of
11. Thus, the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell became the "interregnum," and
Charles II was deemed to have ascended the throne in 1649 at the death of his father.
12. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
98-128 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958).
13. See R.H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (1926). For a
rebuttal of Tawney's equation of Puritanism as economism, see DICKENS, supra note
8, at 316-17.
14. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMER-
ICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
15. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HILL, PURITANISM AND REVOLUTION: STUDIES IN IN-
TERPRETATION OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (St.
Martin's Press 1997) (1958) [hereinafter HILL, PURITANISM AND REVOLUTION]; JOAN
LOCKWOOD O'DONOVAN, THEOLOGY OF LAW AND AUTHORITY IN THE ENGLISH
2005]
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the many factors which the historian must take into account in "doing
history."
Most legal historians fall into the first category described and sim-
ply ignore the role of religion in the development of the common
law. 6 Developments in the law are described solely in terms of inter-
nal dynamics of doctrinal development or as a response to economic
progress. 17 Over the past thirty years, a new historical awareness not
only of the importance of religion to Western history, but, more im-
portantly, a new awareness of how religion has affected that history
has gained currency. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the
standard for analyzing the Reformation and its aftermath was to focus
on its first fifty years on the Continent-from Luther's 95 Theses in
1517 to the Peace of Augsburg in 1555.18 Political developments re-
REFORMATION (John Witte, Jr. & Joan Lockwood O'Donovan eds., 1991); M. M.
KNAPPEN, TUDOR PURITANISM: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF IDEALISM (1939).
16. See, e.g., ALAN HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1966); THEO-
DORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (Little, Brown &
Co. 5th ed., 1956) (1929); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF
CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT (1987) [hereinafter SIMPSON, A
HISTORY OF CONTRACT]; KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT (Paul L. Murphy ed., 1990); John W. Salmond, The
History of Contract, 3 L.Q. REV. 166 (1887).
17. See, e.g., Clinton W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial Administration and the
Development of Contract Law in Seventeenth-Century England, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
35, 36 (1983).
Most treatises on the early common law of contract can be described as "in-
ternal" historiographies. They are almost universally concerned with doctri-
nal legal history and primarily offer a "description" rather than a "thesis."
They either ignore or openly avoid analysis of causation in legal develop-
ment .... Those rare departures from the doctrinal legal history mold have
constructed rather vague economic paradigms that depict the development
of contract law as an evolutionary process paralleling the movement of En-
glish society from a feudal to a market-based economy.
Id. Two historians of the common law and notable exceptions to this general rule.
John Eusden and Harold Berman have each written extensively on the relationship of
Puritanism and the law. See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II:
THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADI-
TION (2003) [hereinafter BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II]; JOHN DYKSTRA EUS-
DEN, PURITANS, LAWYERS, AND POLITICS IN EARLY SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND (1958).
18. PHILIP S. GORSKI, THE DISCIPLINARY REVOLUTION: CALVINISM AND THE
RISE OF THE STATE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 15 (2003) ("[T]he old framework for
studying the Reformation advanced by Ranke almost 150 years ago has given way to
a new framework focusing on confessionalization.") (footnote omitted). For exam-
ples of the older framework, see ROLAND H. BAINTON, THE REFORMATION OF THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1952); JOHN P. DOLAN, HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION: A
CONCILIATORY ASSESSMENT OF OPPOSITE VIEWS (1965) (interpreting, with a Catho-
lic distinction, the Reformation ending in the 1560s); HANS J. HILLERBRAND, THE
REFORMATION (1964) (stating that first-person selections begin at the time of the
birth of Martin Luther and end with the Council of Trent); STEVEN OZMENT, THE
AGE OF REFORM 1250-1550: AN INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF LATE
MEDIEVAL AND REFORMATION EUROPE (1980) (beginning his account in 1250, Oz-
ment, nonetheless, ends in the sixteenth century); SPITZ, supra note 4.
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ceived attention only in so far as the politics of the day contributed to
the spread of doctrines, liturgies, and sacramental practices. Eco-
nomic developments were usually ignored, and the interplay between
the Reformation and social practices such as education, sexual behav-
ior, and legal systems received short shrift. 9 However,
Recent accounts have adopted a very different periodization, divid-
ing the Reformation into three, overlapping segments, each with its
own distinctive sociopolitical dynamic: (1) a diffuse evangelical
movement (ca. 1517-25), which advocated religious reform based
on the Gospels, often with strong social and communal overtones;
(2) a reformation from above . .. (ca. 1520-45), in which the civil
authorities effected various liturgical and ecclesiastical reforms; and
(3) a confessional age (ca. 1540-1648), in which the construction of
national or territorial churches and wars of belief reinforced and
drove one another forward.2°
The phrase "confessionalization paradigm" has been applied to this
contemporary approach to history of the Reformation period. 21 The
confessionalization paradigm provides a framework for connecting the
significant religious changes that marked the Reformation with
broader political, economic, and social changes. No longer should
"religion" be relegated to the private sphere of individual belief, nor
ought religion to be treated as a mere epiphenomenon of material
(i.e., economic) changes. 22
19. See JOHN WITTE, JR., LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE LEGAL TEACHINGS OF
THE LUTHERAN REFORMATION (2002) (taking seriously the effects of the Lutheran
Reformation on the full range of German laws-civil-ecclesiastical jurisdiction, juris-
prudence, education, and marriage).
20. GORSKI, supra note 18, at 15-16.
21. PHILIP BENEDICT, CHRIST'S CHURCHES PURELY REFORMED: A SOCIAL HIS-
TORY OF CALVINISM Xix (2002) ("The boldest macrointerpretations of the past three
decades have depicted Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism as spurring parallel,
not contrasting, transformations in European society, notably a process of 'confes-
sionalization' according to which all three promoted state integration and the produc-
tion of disciplined, obedient subjects ... ").
22. See generally Wolfgang Reinhard, Pressures Towards Confessionalization?
Prolegomena to a Theory of the Confessional Age, in THE GERMAN REFORMATION
169, 172-92 (C. Scott Dixon et al. eds., 1999) (discussing that the confessionalization
paradigm also presents a technique for a holistic analysis of the differences and simi-
larities among the three confessional strands that came from the Reformation: the
Lutheran, the Calvinist, and the Catholic). While the theological doctrines of the
three Christian confessional traditions emerging from the 150 years ending in 1648
differed significantly, it is of interest to the historian that the statecraft and social
practices of lands dominated by each of the three doctrines were similar in some re-
spects and differed in others. In each early modern European nation state, "political
identity was ... created ... through consistent internal confessionalization." Id. at
186. The varying theological understandings of the three large groups transformed
the relationship between the sacred and the secular in their respective territories. At
the same time, the political, economic, and social soil in which the confessional groups
flourished guided the ultimate theological results. Finally, competition among the
three confessions reinforced their distinctives, increased the power of their corre-
sponding states, and unified those states around their distinctives. See id. at 183.
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With respect to the common law of contracts, the confessionaliza-
tion paradigm offers a context in which to consider the relationship
between religious change in England and changes in the common law
of contracts. Such a comparison does not presuppose any direct cor-
relation between the two. Chronologically, the expansion of the use
of assumpsit began long before the rise of Puritanism. With respect to
the legal doctrines of consideration and the independence of promises
and the theological doctrine of the covenant, it turns out that Puritan
covenant theology was overwhelmingly soteriological in focus and, in
any event, sufficiently diverse as to support divergent paths of devel-
opment in contract law. There is no causative relationship between
this crucial Puritan doctrine and legal developments.
On the other hand, the nature of Puritan life had a significant im-
pact on England in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
The Protestant/Puritan religious emphasis on the "new man" in
Christ, stressing the virtues of instrumental rationality, literacy, or-
dered diligence, and vocational productivity, together with a renewed
emphasis on mutual discipline, helped create a culture which was ori-
ented toward increasing the efficiency of the means and tools of pro-
duction, including substantive law. Moreover, the virtues inculcated
by Puritanism were consistent with centralization of state power, in-
cluding expanding the range of centralized, unified judicial power.23
In short, it was the social practices of Puritanism, ultimately grounded
in Puritan theology, which effected the development of contract law in
England.
The Authors' thesis will be developed along the following lines: In
Part II, one must briefly consider the constitutional crisis provoked by
the expanding Tudor-Stuart assertions of the royal prerogative. In
Part III, one will slow down to consider Puritan covenant theology at
length. Few will deny that the doctrine of the covenant occupied a
central place in Puritan theology. It is in the doctrine of the covenant
where, if anywhere, there will be identifiable correlation between Pu-
ritan theology and contract law. Moreover, the Puritan doctrine of
covenant has been so frequently misrepresented that a correction is
needed in any event. This section will also address Puritan discipline,
both individual and ecclesiastical. In Part IV, a number of cases will
be looked at to see how and when the English courts expanded the
reach of assumpsit, how they refined the notion of consideration, and
how they dealt with the defenses to contractual liability once under-
taken. Finally, in Part V, the Conclusion, the Author hopes to tie the
theological beliefs and social practices predominant in Puritanism to-
23. The English Civil War and execution of Charles I seem to contradict treating
Puritanism as a force of enhanced state power. Yet, concentration of political power
with the central state continued apace under the Commonwealth and Protectorate,
and it was at this time that the common law's triumph over its rivals was at its great-
est. See also infra text accompanying notes 64-69.
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gether with developments in law of contracts. While Puritan theology
made no unique contributions to contract law, developments in this
field of law were informed by this distinctively English tradition of
Protestant Christianity. And when these long-standing approaches to
life and the law eventually exploded in Puritanism and the English
Revolution, they helped channel developments in the law of contracts.
II. STATECRAFT AND ECONOMICS IN REFORMATION ENGLAND
A. Dominium Politicum et Regale to Royal Rule
After nearly a century of weak monarchs, culminating in the civil
War of the Roses, England's move toward a strong central govern-
ment gained impetus with the accession of Henry VII to the throne in
1485.24 Henry VII's marriage to Elizabeth of York united the houses
of York and Lancaster, which contributed to stabilizing the dynastic
succession of the English monarchy.25 Thus, Henry VIII inherited a
secure throne and "felt strong enough to give his Council great au-
thority and latitude."26 With a powerful Council which he could dom-
inate and trust, Henry was able to expand the effective reach of the
monarchy's power.27 The powerful aristocracy which had dominated
England during the preceding century had eliminated each other by
1509.28 Henry not only delegated the growing executive authority to
his Council but also reinvigorated and greatly expanded centralized
administrative and judicial power through the Court of the Star
Chamber, the Council of Wales, the Council of the North, the Court
of Requests, and the like. 29 These feudal quasi-judicial or administra-
tive courts had lain dormant for years, but with their renewal, they
provided the crown with means by which it could control areas of ter-
24. As an English historian has noted:
Henry VII came to the throne with a weak title; yet people were so weary of
war, the peerage had been so enfeebled, and the Crown was now so strongly
supported by the rising classes of gentry and merchants that Henry with his
wise caution was able to overcome all difficulties.
A.R. MYERS, ENGLAND IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 211 (8th ed. 1971).
25. See id. at 203 (noting that Henry married Elizabeth of York, "eldest daughter
of Edward the IV" and "the person with the strongest hereditary right" to the throne
of England).
26. Id. at 212.
27. Id. Myers states:
The fact that the Council had greater prominence in the government of
Henry VIII than it had had ... did not mean that the royal control had in
any way weakened .... Henry VIII felt strong enough to give his Council
great authority and latitude while he still remained in complete command of
affairs.
Id.
28. Id. at 206 ("Civil war, sterility, and mortality had so thinned the ranks of the
older peerage that by 1509 only one duke and one marquis were left in England.").
29. See id. at 213-14; see also David Ogg, Introduction to IOANNIS SELDENI, AD
FLETAM DISSERTATIO li-lvii (David Ogg ed., 1925) (1647) (containing an excellent
discussion of each of these prerogative courts).
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ritory and aspects of life effectively ungoverned by any central author-
ity for one hundred years.30 Yet, until after the accession of James I in
1603, the common understanding of the relationship of the king and
his subjects remained consistent with the long standing medieval para-
digm, the dominium politicum et regale (royal and political rule).
John Fortescue (ca. 1396-ca. 1486) was both a common lawyer and
the leading English constitutional theorist until Edward Coke.3' In
De natura legis naturae (Concerning the Law of Nature),32 Fortescue
asserted that "the king of England cannot change the laws of the
realm at his pleasure, and that statutes are made not merely by the
prince's will, but with the 'assent of the whole kingdom.' 13 3 Fortescue
contrasted what he characterized as England's constitutional struc-
ture-dominium politicum et regale-with what he believed was the
absolute monarchy of France-dominium regale (royal rule). 34 Royal
rule was the exertion of the will of the one on the many and quickly
degenerated into "tyranny . . . because it neglects the common good
and lacks the consent of the governed."35 Royal and political rule, by
contrast, originates in an understanding that a governing head (regale)
is necessary but that such a head needs the input of the many
(politicum) to be directed to the common good.36 Fortescue never
had the occasion to work out a resolution to the problem that would
arise when the head and the many disagreed about the common
good,37 but skillful heads were able to avoid such a conflict until the
seventeenth century. The Tudor line from Henry VII to Elizabeth I
continued to garner power into the monarchy, but each made full use
30. See MYERS, supra note 24, at 212-13 ("[I]t was not so much that the council-
lors [sic] exercised new powers as that the traditional powers of the Council were
revived and enforced by men who acted solely in accordance with the king's wishes.").
31. See LOCKWOOD O'DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 43 ("Fortescue [was] a com-
mon lawyer, devoted to the legal and judicial welfare of his country .... Fortescue's
political thought ... [was] oriented to steering England's limited monarchy toward
increased respect for the rule of law.").
32. John Fortescue, De Natura Legis Naturae, in THE WORKS OF SIR JOHN
FORTESCUE (Thomas Fortescue ed., 1869) (1486).
33. MYERS, supra note 24, at 220 (quoting JOHN FORTESCUE, De Natura Legis
Naturae); see Fortescue, supra note 32, at 77 ("The kings make not laws, nor impose
subsidies on their subjects, without the consent of the three Estates of the Realms.").
34. MYERS, supra note 24, at 220.
35. LOCKWOOD O'DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 52.
36. See Fortescue, supra note 32, at 346 (Royal and political rule is "a body of men
joined together in society by a consent of right, by a union of interests, and for pro-
moting the common good."). For a somewhat more skeptical view of Fortescue's un-
derstanding of royal and political rule, see Colin Richmond & Margaret Lucille
Kekewich, The Search for Stability, 1461-1483, in THE POLITICS OF FIFTEENTH-CEN-
TURY ENGLAND 43, 64 (1995) ("Fortescue's 'dominium politicum et regale', [sic]
taken in context, could be the ploy of a clever and well educated lawyer rather than
the ideal of a believer in constitutional checks and balances.").
37. As Professor Lockwood O'Donovan comments: "[Tihese two bases of politi-
cal authority [the 'royal' and the 'political' in 'royal and political'] stand in tension in
Fortescue's thought, being in no way systematically related." LOCKWOOD
O'DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 53.
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of Parliament in addition to the royal prerogatives to achieve their
ends.
38
The accession of James I in 1603 marked a turning point in English
constitutional development.39 James I of England had been James VI
of Scotland since he was thirteen months old and had ruled since he
was nineteen.4 0 James ruled Scotland for eighteen years before be-
coming king of England.41 During that time, he waged successful
struggles with the Scottish nobility for control of the nation and with
Scotland's established Presbyterian Church for government of the
church.42 James was thus predisposed toward a strong, if not absolu-
tist, monarchy. But not until he had been king of England for seven
years did James's royal will extend beyond the recognized preroga-
tives of his predecessors.
Long-standing tradition limited English royal revenue to a few
sources: crown lands, feudal dues (including knight-service and ward-
ship), payments for grants of monopolies, and customs duties.43 Par-
liamentary consent was required for most other sources of revenue.44
By 1610, James decided to address his long standing financial concerns
and called a Parliament to organize his revenue stream on a sounder
(and more lucrative) footing.45 The Great Contract, as it was known,
foundered for various reasons leaving a sense of rancor on both sides
and James without any more income.4 6 Having had no success with
Parliament, James ruled for much of the next ten years without it.
38. See J.P. KENYON, THE CIVIL WARS OF ENGLAND 6 (1988). Further stating:
England was almost unique in Europe in that her medieval 'estates', [sic] or
parliament, had survived into the modern era with its powers and rights not
only intact but even increasing .... The Tudors had never challenged Parlia-
ment's position, nor had they built up a provincial bureaucracy or a regular
army which would have given them the leverage to do so.
Id.
39. See G. E. AYLMER, A SHORT HISTORY OF 17TH-CENTURY ENGLAND:
1603-1689, at 11, 18 (1963) (observing that the constitutional conflict is the focus of
his look at seventeenth-century England and noting the main chronological divisions
of the time covered in his book, with the accession of James I in 1603 as the first
critical date).
40. See id. at 21.
41. Id. (observing that James Stuart was nearly thirty-seven when he became king
of England).
42. See id. at 22.
43. See id. at 61-62.
44. See id. at 62-63 (explaining that the most significant non-parliamentary tax
that the monarch could impose was for "Ship-Money," but this power existed only in
times of war); infra text accompanying notes 59-61.
45. AYLMER, supra note 39, at 66-67 (observing that after the king's debt doubled
in five years, the "Great Contract" was initiated in order to set the king's finances "on
a sounder footing").
46. See DONALD VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM
1640-1660, at 57 (1970).
In 1610 there were negotiations between James I and Parliament to end the
feudal incidents of knights service by a Great Contract whereby the king
would be compensated by revenue from other sources. The Commons con-
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Even the popular Elizabeth had never gone more than five years with-
out summoning the politicum for advice on the common good.4 7 Si-
multaneously, James pushed the limits of the royal prerogative for
sources of additional revenue by increasing customs duties, squeezing
wardships for ever more money, and granting additional monopo-
lies.48 Royal and political rule was sliding toward royal rule by default
and design.
Centralization of political and religious authority in the king (or
queen) and the monarch's Council had marked all of the Tudors. Yet,
each had been careful to gain the consent of the politicum every step
of the way.49 Jean Bodin had brought the concept of sovereignty to
the fore of political and constitutional thought in 1577 with the publi-
cation of Six livres de la Rdpublique (Six Books of the Common-
wealth).50 James was certainly well acquainted with Bodin. 51 Bodin
asserted that only a fully sovereign monarch could deal with the con-
flicting claims to power arising from the collapse of the medieval or-
der due to the Reformation. Bodin's rationalism, with his desire to
specify the locus of sovereignty in the smallest possible logical space,
replaced medieval organicism's emphasis on dominium grounded in
the interlocking web of natural law. By a compact existing from time
immemorial, there existed a contract between a king and his subjects
by which indivisible sovereignty-for the common good-was vested
in the king.52 Neither Bodin nor James suggested that sovereignty ex-
isted apart from either God or the law.53 But after 1610, the tensions
between James and Parliament revealed the ambiguity in Fortescue's
thought: If sovereignty were vested in the monarch, who could judge
when the monarch failed to exercise that sovereignty for the common
good? The royal answer had the virtue of simplicity: "Only God could
be judge, naturally, because otherwise a subject or judge would be
able to constitute a superior power over the king. The king alone
could decide how a contract with his subjects should be kept .... ,
sidered the price suggested too high and James thought he would lose his
power to influence and control many of his influential subjects.
Id.
47. See AYLMER, supra note 39, at 68.
48. See id. at 62-63.
49. For a description of Elizabeth's use of Parliament and Convocation in religious
matters, see KNAPPEN, supra note 15, at 270 (explaining that because of Elizabeth's
reluctance to reveal her hand, "everything [Archbishop Whitgift did to require wear-
ing of the prescribed vestments] had to be done under the guise of law, without direct
appeal to the prerogative").
50. JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (M.J. Tooley trans., Mac-
millan 1955) (1576).
51. See GEORGE L. MOSSE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND
31-33, 61-62 (1950).
52. LOCKWOOD O'DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 52-53.
53. See MOSSE, supra note 51, at 61 ("Contracts were sacred to Bodin under the
law of nature. James, too, dwelled on the sacredness of contracts ... .
54. Id.
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Political and royal rule should give way to royal rule. But for the in-
tervention of the common lawyers, then Parliament, and later the Pu-
ritans, England's constitutional structure would have moved toward
royal absolutism.
Charles I's reign can be briefly described as a continuing effort to
rule with Parliament but, when that proved unsatisfactory to Charles,
to rule without Parliament. The unsettling results of Charles's first
two parliaments led him to adopt personal rule-royal rule-for the
next eleven years (1629-1640).56 The longest previous interval be-
tween parliaments in recent times had been nine years early in Henry
VIII's reign.57 The ordinary machinery of government continued to
function without Parliament, as it always had. Finances proved again
to be the monarch's Achilles' heel. Charles continued to press the
traditional sources of royal revenue to the limit but, nonetheless,
found himself short of funds.58 He then turned to a source of revenue
grounded in the royal prerogative but not previously used in peace-
time: Ship-Money. Professor Aylmer observes that "[t]here were
good precedents from the sixteenth century and even from James' [sic]
reign for raising this levy from the coastal towns and counties in time
of war or obvious national emergency. ' 59 Yet, Charles imposed the
levy on coastal areas in 1634 when England was at peace and ex-
55. Id. at 62 ("Contrast James's conclusion [that the king is sovereign over the law]
.. with Coke's dictum that 'The common law hath so admeasured the prerogative of
the king, as he cannot take nor prejudice the inheritance of any: and the best inheri-
tance the subject hath, is the law of the realm."') (footnote omitted). Coke's response
was typical of many on the Continent who sought to revive historical custom to stem
the advance of rational absolutism. See, e.g., J. G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTI-
TUTION AND FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEV-
ENTEENTH CENTURY (1987). Further stating:
Since there was an increasing tendency to claim sovereignty in the full sense
for the king, it was natural that those who sought to defend threatened privi-
leges or liberties should emphasize in return that their rights were rooted in
a law which no king could invade .... Hotman in Francogallia asserted the
antiquity of the assembly of the nation; Coke in England that of parliament
and the common law; Pietro de Gregorio in Sicily that of baronial privilege
and the parlamento; Franqois Vranck in the Netherlands that of the sover-
eign and independent Dutch towns; Erik Sparre in Sweden that of the nobles
in their riksrad.
Id. at 16. All did not go well for James's efforts to increase royal power. Due to his
need for funds to finance wars in Europe, James was forced to call Parliaments into
session in his later years where it prevailed in its efforts to address foreign policy
(formerly solely a royal prerogative) and succeed in abolishing individual monopolies.
See Statute of Monopolies Act, 1623, 21 Jam., c. 3 (Eng.).
56. See 2 KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY: REFOR-
MATION TO THE PRESENT 819 (1953) [hereinafter LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF
CHRISTIANITY II].
57. See AYLMER, supra note 39, at 85.
58. Id. at 91 ("Even in the middle 1630s the King was still burdened with large
debts; he had to go on borrowing in order to make ends meet ....
59. Id. at 92.
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panded it to the whole nation in 1636 when no war was imminent.6 °
The ability of the king to exercise unfettered discretion of what consti-
tuted a national emergency found its way to the courts when John
Hampden, a wealthy inland landlord, refused to pay the tax. The
judgment rendered in the aptly-named Ship Money Case61 by the Ex-
chequer Court (made up of all the barons and judges of the Excheq-
uer, Kings Bench, and Common Pleas) upheld the king's authority to
make this determination:62 the dominium regale et politicum had been
stretched to the breaking point.
B. Royal Rule to the Execution of the King
The maelstrom of the politics of the Long Parliament and the Civil
War need not be dwelt upon. Charles was forced to call a Parliament
in 1640 to fund a military campaign to subdue a rebellious Scotland.63
After a fitful start, the resulting "Long Parliament" remained in ses-
sion for the next thirteen years and step-by-step effected the transfer
of sovereignty to itself.64 The medieval constitutional order finally
broke in 1649 with the execution of Charles I for treason.61 Parlia-
ment's efforts were not directed solely toward displacing the monar-
chy. Parliament acted to remove all centers of dominium but its own.
Thus, it quickly abolished the royal prerogative courts,66 the royal
conciliar bodies, 67 as well as the Court of High Commission (the
Church of England's highest ecclesiastical court) and the Bishops'
60. Id. at 92 ("[B]y 1636 the tax had been extended from the coastal areas to the
whole country, and it was clearly becoming a regular form of revenue, even though
the country was still at peace.").
61. The King v. Hampden, 3 Howell's State Trials 825 (1816).
62. Id.
63. Charles attempted to force the staunchly Presbyterian Church of Scotland to
adopt the Anglican liturgy, which led to the so-called "Bishops' Wars" in 1637-1639.
See AYLMER, supra note 39, at 106-11; see also KENYON, supra note 38, at 15-19.
64. For example, Parliament passed the Triennial Act, 1641, 16 Car., c. 1 (Eng.),
which required the Parliament be called into session at least once every three years
and acts prohibiting the king from dissolving parliament without its consent, and abol-
ishing the levy for Ship Money. See Colonel Richard D. Rosen, Funding "Non-Tradi-
tional" Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse,
155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1998).
65. See AYLMER, supra note 39, at 147-48.
Although the English Republic only lasted just over eleven years, the King's
death and the abolition of the monarchy ... symbolised the outcome, not
only of the Civil War, but of the much longer and more far-reaching consti-
tutional conflict .... [T]he balance of political power was more decisively
affected by this than by any other event in [English] history.").
Id.
66. See F. A. INDERWICK, THE INTERREGNUM 180 (London, Sampson Low, Mar-
ston, Searle & Rivington Ltd. 1891).
67. See 6 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 302 (1927) ("From
the purely legal point of view, the most important result of the Great Rebellion had
been to reduce to insignificance very many of those courts which had, in the preceding
period, been formidable rivals of the common law.").
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Courts.68 The three historic common law courts of King's Bench,
Common Pleas, and Exchequer now virtually monopolized judicial
power in England.69
The trend toward centralization from the Tudors through the end of
the monarchy seems inexorable. England outgrew the organic medie-
val order with its presuppositions of natural political relationships.
Sovereignty found a home, but it was not in kingly rule. The politicum
triumphed over the regale. Neither Protestantism in general nor its
more self-conscious particularization of Puritanism was necessary to
the creation of a modern state in England. After all, Catholic and
Lutheran nations experienced the same process.7 Yet, Protestantism
and Puritanism certainly molded the form which England's central-
ized modern government came to take:71 Parliament, not the king, was
sovereign in England.
C. England's First Industrial Revolution and the Rise of Capitalism
Economic changes in England during the Reformation period cen-
tered around four issues: land, labor, monopolies, and usury. Solu-
tions to the problems raised by the first two were found in judicial
enforcement of private contracts. The courts and Parliament solved
the problem of monopolies, a species of "anti-contract," by striking
them down and thus elevating contract to its principal place as the
means of social organization.72 Parliament gradually weakened the
ancient prohibitions against usury. As an economic historian noted
seventy years ago, "[d]uring the height of English mercantilism [under
Henry VIII] a movement toward economic liberalism was in progress
which for its final success depended in part upon the attitude of the
courts and the common law."' 73 Henry's dissolution of the monas-
teries released an enormous amount of under-utilized capital assets
into the stream of commerce, which provided the material resources
for England's first industrial revolution.74 Rather than Protestantism
68. INDERWICK, supra note 66, at 184.
69. Chancery remained, but its range of activities were reduced. See id. at 180;
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 67, at 302.
70. See generally GORSKI, supra note 18, at 159-60 (discussing state-formation of
the various regimes in the Netherlands, Bohemia, Bavaria, Prussia, and France).
71. Id. ("This is not to say that there was a constant conjunction between confes-
sion and regime ... ; obviously, there was not. Rather, it is to say that confessional
conflict was a key mechanism that influenced the type of regime-constitutionalist
versus absolutist-that emerged .... ").
72. See DAVID LIrLE, RELIGION, ORDER, AND LAW: A STUDY IN PRE-REVOLU-
TIONARY ENGLAND 204-09 (Benjamin Nelson ed., 1969); see also AYLMER, supra
note 39, at 117 ("Several measures were passed against the unconstitutional taxation
and other financial abuses of the 1630s... there were Acts ... against monopolies.").
73. Donald 0. Wagner, Coke and the Rise of Economic Liberalism, 6 ECON. HIST.
REV. 30 (1935).
74. MOSSE, supra note 51, at 95 ("[T]here were two distinct industrial revolutions
in England .... The first of these rapid economic changes occurred in the century
which began with the dissolution of the monasteries and ended with the outbreak of
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per se, "the laicising of landed capital was a vastly more potent factor
for change than any support which late Protestant economic theory
may have given to an already long-established capitalist ethic."75
Even before the dissolution of the monasteries, the reduction in
numbers of the old nobility had allowed Henry to raise many to the
peerage who did not share their predecessors' willingness to maintain
outmoded means of agricultural production.76 In the previous cen-
tury, the new class of commercial traders in wool had greatly ex-
panded which, in turn, increased the utility of large scale sheep
farming.77 Not only did more land coming into productive use mark
the end of the feudal system of land tenure,78 it marked the beginning
of the shift from status to contract, which Henry Maine noted over a
century ago.79
The new gentry landlords were faced with at least two means by
which they could reorganize their relationships to those who had been
feudal tenants. The path not followed was to sell many small plots of
land to the peasantry; there was no way a small farmer of feudal origin
could have financed cash purchases, and sales would have reduced the
gentry's ability to control the use of the land by those who farmed it.8"
Instead, the new owners entered into leases to replace the feudal ten-
the Civil War."); STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEVANCES OF
THE COMMONWEALTH," 1621-1628, at 79 (1979) (noting that Edward Coke reached
the same conclusion: "Later in life ... [Coke] came close to suggesting that defects in
the law were also caused by the increasing prosperity of landholders and by increased
activity in the land market, which were phenomena that he saw as resulting from the
dissolution of the monasteries .... "); see also HILL, PURITANISM AND REVOLUTION,
supra note 15, at 198 (discussing the effects of England's first industrial revolution in
the century between the Reformation and the Civil War); Francis, supra note 17, at 43
("Coke, and later Barrington, also accentuated the importance of the sixteenth-cen-
tury dissolution of the monasteries as a factor that added to litigation by bolstering
the wealth of laymen.").
75. DICKENS, supra note 8, at 335.
76. See MYERS, supra note 24, at 226-28 (discussing rise of merchant class, inter-
marriage into nobility, and need for aristocracy to compete economically in early six-
teenth century England).
77. See TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 27 ("Already by the fifteenth century, capitalist
clothiers were buying wool and selling abroad what was made by jobbing workers ....
The brisk demand for wool from clothiers brought a commercialization of land as
agricultural land was enclosed for grazing."); see also C. H. S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND
SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 289-92 (1949) (discussing
growth of international trade in England from medieval through early Tudor times).
78. See MYERS, supra note 24, at 228-35 (discussing the increasing economic com-
petition and efficiency, which "mark[ed] the close of medieval England").
79. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (New York, Charles Scribner &
Co. 1871) ("[Tlhe movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a move-
ment from Status to Contract.").
80. Anyone purchasing formerly monastic land would also have become subject to
the feudal dues for relief of knight-service, which further reduced its alienability. See
Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Seventeenth-Century Revolution in the English Land Law, 43
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 238-39 (1995) (discussing Henry VIII's revival of virtually
forgotten feudal incidents to enhance the royal revenue).
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ures or copyholds.8 1 Similarly, the increased recognition of copyhold
and protection of its alienability by even the common law courts pro-
moted a contractual ordering of social and legal relationships to
land.82 The new gentry moved quickly to employ new and improved
agricultural technology as it developed over the next century. 83 In-
creased agricultural efficiency decreased the landlords' needs for la-
bor. Landlords thus "enclosed" larger and larger portions of their
estates, forcing peasant farmers from the land and into the cities.84
The effects of enclosure were drastic85 and were still being felt in En-
glish society in the 1640s.86
Reformation England's questions of labor are closely related to in-
dustrial development. Industry began to grow substantially during
81. See VEALL, supra note 46, at 55-59.
Thus in England the decay of the feudal land system was followed by the
landlord and tenant relationship, whereas in other countries this decay led to
the splitting up of land into numerous freehold interests. Precise, limited,
and determinable contracts were substituted for traditional, customary, and
indeterminate rights; the land law was changing from status to contract.
Id. at 59; see also STEVE HINDLE, THE STATE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EARLY MOD-
ERN ENGLAND, C. 1550-1640, at 44 (2000) ("[O]n average, customary tenants formed
perhaps two-thirds or even more of the land-holding population in the early sixteenth
century. By contrast, it has been estimated that two-thirds of the land market was
structured by leasehold relations by the mid-seventeenth century.").
82. See Reid, supra note 80, at 247-49 (discussing the rise of central (prerogative
and common law) courts as opposed to earlier merely manorial judicial protection for
the copyhold interests of yeoman farmers).
83. See id. at 252-61 (discussing at length the lengthy battle over the power of the
gentry to enclose common lands culminating in the elimination of common rights and
common fields in the eighteenth century).
84. See id. at 253. As Charles Reid notes:
Excitement was particularly aroused at that time [at the end of the fifteenth
century] over rural depopulation. It was perceived that villages that had
been steadily inhabited for several hundred years were being emptied of
their people. The conclusion was quickly drawn that the enclosures of
wealthier landholders ... were responsible.
Id.
85. See id. at 253-54. Further stating:
This novel phenomenon was denounced by the intellectual and religious es-
tablishment of early Tudor England [e.g., Thomas More and Hugh Latimer].
... Nor were the intellectuals and religious leaders alone in their protests.
Popular uprisings against enclosure were also a part of the early Tudor scene.
... Throughout the sixteenth century, furthermore, peasants enjoyed con-
siderable success bringing actions against enclosers in the royal courts.
Id.
86. See id. at 257-58 ("The pro-enclosure arguments were part of a national de-
bate that endured through the 1650s."); see also THE LARGER CATECHISM: AGREED
UPON BY THE ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES AT WESTMINSTER 63-64 (Dodd & Rumsey
1912) (1867) [hereinafter THE LARGER CATECHISM]. Question and Answer 142 state
as follows: "Q. What are the sins forbidden in the eighth commandment? A. The sins
forbidden in the eighth commandment ... are ... unjust enclosures and depopulation
.... THE LARGER CATECHISM, supra at 63-64.
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Elizabeth's reign.87 Industrial growth continued through the Stuart
monarchies both because of the availability of cheap labor from con-
tinuing enclosures and because of the flow of wealth from the colo-
nies.88 Just as contract (in the form of leases) had replaced feudal
tenure in the countryside, so, too, contract became the principal tool
of control in the newly industrialized urban centers. As Clinton Fran-
cis observed, "[g]rowing industry required equipment, materials, and
labor, and contract provided the cohesive force need to combine them
both to each other and to the marketplace where the manufactured
goods were sold."89
The early seventeenth century common law's opposition to monop-
olies is well known.90 The famous decision in Bonham's Case,91 which
has become the basis of the American principle of judicial review, was
fundamentally about a monopoly.92 Grants of monopolies by the
monarch or by Parliament limited contractual ordering. Unlike the
movement toward greater contractual ordering of relationships be-
tween landlords and tenants and between employers and employees
that the common law courts merely recognized and enforced, elimina-
tion of monopolies required the courts to take an active role. Parlia-
ment ultimately resolved the conflict between the courts and the king
over the extent of the royal prerogative to grant monopolies. 93
III. GOD AND MAN IN PURITANISM: COVENANT AND LIFE
A. A Primer on Puritanism
1. Definition and General Characteristics
The term "Puritan" finds its origin at the time of the Vestarian (or
Vestiarian) Controversy in the 1560s. 94 As with many such labels, it
87. See Francis, supra note 17, at 43 ("Starting in Elizabeth I's reign, industry grew
in size and variety. People followed industry to the cities ....").
88. See id. at 121 ("A dynamic market had replaced custom as the measuring stick
of exchanges and the new-found wealth of the colonies contributed to this [early sev-
enteenth-century] wave of speculation."); see also HINDLE, supra note 81, at 39-42
(analyzing growth of and changes in distribution of population in late sixteenth cen-
tury England); TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 27 (discussing economic effects of 600%
inflation in the sixteenth century on the English commercial and industrial growth).
89. Francis, supra note 17, at 128.
90. See, e.g., LITTLE, supra note 72; Wagner, supra note 73.
91. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610).
92. See generally Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40
HARV. L. REV. 30 (1926) (providing an excellent analysis of this case).
93. See supra text accompanying note 72.
94. John Witte, Jr., Blest Be the Ties That Bind: Covenant and Community in Puri-
tan Thought, 36 EMORY L.J. 579, 579 n.3 (1987) ("The term 'Puritan' ... was coined
during the Vestarian Controversy (1559-1567) ...."). The Vestarian Controversy
took its name from the opposition of some (known thereafter as Puritans) to the
requirement that clergy wear particular vestments while celebrating the liturgy. See
generally LATOURET-rE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY II, supra note 56, at 814
(describing the origin and growth of Puritanism).
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seems to have originated as a term of derision.95 "Puritan" was first
used among the majority who supported the Elizabethan Settlement
with its mandated clerical garb (vestments).96 Reacting against the
Tudor understanding of the supremacy of the dominium politicum et
regale in the church, a number of the post-Marian generation of eccle-
siastics, thereafter known as Puritans, rejected the power of the civil
government to prescribe ecclesiastical rules.97 Further agreement on
a definition of Puritan or Puritanism has escaped historians and theo-
logians.9 As Christopher Hill notes, "'Puritan' too is an admirable
refuge from clarity of thought."9 9 In Defining Puritanism-again?,100
Peter Lake describes three definitions that have been widely pro-
posed: some have used Puritanism as shorthand for a movement for
"further reformation in the government or liturgy of the church"1 °1 in
England, others have seen it as an intensely zealous promotion of a
"subset of a larger body of reformed"'10 2 doctrines, and, finally, a third
proposal has been to jettison the term Puritanism in its entirety. 10 3
Lake, himself, amalgamates the second and third positions:
I would wish to see Puritanism as a distinctive style of piety and
divinity .... as a synthesis made of strands most or many of which
taken individually could be found in non-Puritan as well as Puritan
contexts, but which taken together formed a distinctively Puritan
synthesis or style.104
Lake's definition incorporates the two aspects of the Protestant im-
pulse in England that will prove useful to this study: a realization that
Puritanism was a lived doctrine and that it differed only in degree
from the larger socio-religious milieu in which it was found. Most per-
95. See HILL, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM, supra note 6, at 2 ("Like most political
nicknames, it was a 'reproachful name' .... ).
96. See LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY II, supra note 56, at 810-12
(describing the essential features of the Elizabethan Settlement as the Act of
Supremacy, the Act of Uniformity, and the promulgation of the Thirty-Nine Articles
of Religion).
97. See LOCKWOOD O'DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 116 ("At issue in the vestiarian
controversy was the civil ruler's right to legislate church order either without or
against the explicit authorization of Scripture.").
98. See Peter Lake, Defining Puritanism-again?, in PURITANISM: TRANSATLAN-
TIC PERSPECTIVES ON A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ANGLO-AMERICAN FAITH 3, 3
(Francis J. Bremer ed., 1993) ("The definition of Puritanism is an issue which has
been both addressed and avoided to great profit by many great scholars."); see also
AYLMER, supra note 39, at 55 ("The first difficulty in discussing Puritans and Puritan-
ism is that of definition. Historians do not agree either on who they were or what
their movement stood for.").
99. HILL, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM, supra note 6, at 1.
100. Lake, supra note 98.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 4.
103. See id. at 5.
104. Id. at 6.
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sons fitting Lake's definition remained in the Church of England. a°5
Of these, some were satisfied with the existing Episcopal form of hier-
archical church government while others preferred Presbyterian-
ism.1"6 A third group of Puritans, known as Independents, sought
greater congregational autonomy within the Church of England while,
fourthly, a few, at least until the 1640s, wanted complete congrega-
tional independence."0 7
Over seventy years ago, Marshall Knappen observed the full-orbed
approach to life that characterized Puritanism: "[T]heir morality was
of a practical sort which joined head and heart in a relationship of
mutual leadership and restraint"; 10 8 morality was all-encompassing.
Although the Puritans acknowledged that judgment on earth was
never perfect, they believed that final judgment would be.0 9 The lives
of all who belonged to one of the confessional traditions were marked
by a unity of belief and practice that seems exceptional today.
Catholics, Lutherans, and the Reformed were all committed to disci-
plining individual lives and reorganizing society.' 10 So, too, "warm re-
ligious life" in England in the early seventeenth century was not
confined to Puritans; many non-Puritans in the Church of England
were equally pious."1 Nothing like the Enlightenment privatization
of religion had occurred in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries.
The roots of the English Reformation can be found nearly two hun-
dred years before the identification of Puritans. During the last dec-
ade of his life, John Wyclif (ca. 1330-1384),12 a teacher at Oxford,
developed two theories which were to have significant political and
theological impact in the sixteenth century. In the first instance,
105. See AYLMER, supra note 39, at 54 (noting that most Puritans were still inside
the Church of England in 1603).
106. See id. at 55-56 (discussing three groups of Puritans: Separatists, Presbyteri-
ans, and Episcopalians).
107. See LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY II, supra note 56, at 816-18
(summarizing briefly religious developments in England under the Stuarts); see also
AYLMER, supra note 39, at 55.
108. KNAPPEN, supra note 15, at 342.
109. See id. at 342-43.
110. BENEDICT, supra note 21, at 430. Benedict, a social historian, notes that con-
temporary Reformation historiography:
For upward of a generation, historians of Catholicism have emphasized that
the devotional practices of the Catholic Reformation encouraged laypeople
to pursue a disciplined life of piety whose features shared many elements
with those promoted by the English apostles of practical divinity. More re-
cently, prominent German historians have advanced the view that "social
disciplining" was an offshoot of the "confessionalization process" and a com-
mon concern of all three major post-Reformation confessional families.
Id. (footnote omitted).
111. LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY II, supra note 56, at 818 ("Warm
religious life was not confined to Puritans and Independents. It was also present
among those in the Church of England who held to the Catholic tradition.").
112. LOCKWOOD O'DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 29.
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Wyclif began with the non-controversial premise that God had ple-
nary civil and ecclesiastical dominium.113 Wyclif argued that God
grants an earthly use to political and ecclesiastical authorities only on
the condition of faithful exercise. 14 And, most controversially, Wyclif
concluded that the earthly use is forfeited if its holder does not faith-
fully fulfill his obligations:
Wyclif repeatedly conceives dominion or lordship as a mode of hav-
ing or possessing earthly goods by a title that confers the right of use
and disposal in respect to them. This title is granted by God ... to
the righteous or virtuous man, made deserving by divine grace.
Lacking divine grace and approval, the sinner has no true or evan-
gelical possession of temporalities: his "having" is merely "natural,"
"creaturely," issuing in nothing but abuse.
11 
In the fourteenth century, Wyclif did not turn this argument against
the state but against the pope and papal-dominated church which he
excoriated for its many abuses.1 16 His theory provided theological
cover for the English king and parliaments that wished both to avoid
increasing papal assessments and to tax the church's property for civil
purposes.1 7 While matters between church and state ended inconclu-
sively in Wyclif's day, his "program of ecclesiastical reform ... [pro-
vided] the legislative agenda of King Henry VIII and his
parliaments.""' 8 Wyclif's second contribution to the English Refor-
mation was his anticipation of the Protestant (and notably Puritan)
doctrine of the epistemic supremacy of the Bible.119 Wyclif translated
the Bible into English and sent out itinerant preachers who stressed
the exposition of the biblical text. 2 ° While after his death, both civil
and ecclesiastical authorities suppressed Wyclif's followers, known as
Lollards, they continued an underground existence and provided a
113. See 1 KENNETH ScoTT LATOURETrE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY: REFOR-
MATION TO THE PRESENT 663 (Harper & Row 1975) (1953) [hereinafter LATOUR-
ETrE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY I].
114. See id.
115. LoCKWOOD O'DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 34-35 (footnotes omitted).
116. Id. at 30-31. Further stating:
Wyclif waged a protracted war on behalf of the English King and secular
magnates against the corrupt worldliness of the fourteenth century church:
against the secular pomp and power of its "caesarian prelates"; the excessive
wealth and complacency of its monastic establishments; the religious, moral,
and occasionally criminal indiscipline of its lower clergy.
Id.
117. See LATOURETrE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY I, supra note 113; LOCK-
WOOD O'DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 33-34.
118. LoCKWOOD O'DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 29.
119. Id. at 32 ("For [Wyclif] the Scriptural Word is the actualization in the world of
the divine mind, bearing the transcendent universals of all created being. As such, it
is the repository of all truth and all law, whether logical, ethical, metaphysical, physi-
cal, historical, and so on.").
120. See LATOURETrE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY I, supra note 113, at 664-65.
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springboard for the reception of Protestant ideas in the 1520s and
1530s.' 2 '
Further protestantization and subsequent reaction marked the pe-
riod between Henry VIII's death in 1547 and the Elizabethan Settle-
ment in 1559. Henry VIII's only son, Edward VI, had been reared in
a Protestant household, and although he reigned for only six and one-
half years, ecclesiastical standards moved significantly toward Re-
formed doctrine.122 Mary's efforts to turn England back to Catholi-
cism had no lasting effect except to intensify England's anti-Catholic
sentiment and to drive many leading Protestants to strongholds of the
Reformed church on the Continent from which they returned after
Mary's death imbued with "puritan" ideals. 23
2. Three Formal Standards
The three Westminster Standards-the Westminster Confession of
Faith, the Westminster Larger Catechism, and the Westminster Shorter
Catechism-represent the culmination of Puritan doctrine. In June of
1643, during the English Civil War, the Long Parliament 124 called "an
Assembly of learned and godly Divines" to propose to Parliament fur-
ther reforms to the government, liturgy, and doctrine for the Church
of England.125 The Assembly prepared a Confession of Faith by No-
vember of 1646; the two catechisms followed. 26 Those summoned to
the Assembly represented a wide cross section of English Protestants
121. See DICKENS, supra note 8, at 37 (describing the reprinting of many of Wyclif's
treatises in the 1530s).
122. See LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY II, supra note 56, at 805-07
(discussing generally the Reformation under Edward VI); WILLIAM C. PLACHER, A
HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 227 (1983) ("Under his young son Edward VI
English theology moved closer to Calvin."). Thomas Cranmer's 1549 Book of Com-
mon Prayer and the 1553 FORTY-Two ARTICLES OF RELIGION exemplify the Re-
formed trend of the Edwardian period of the English Reformation.
123. See LOCKWOOD O'DONOVAN, supra note 15, at 91-108 (discussing the Marian
exiles and rise of Puritanism); see also LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY II,
supra note 56, at 808-10 (discussing generally the Catholic reaction under Mary).
124. Charles I initially acquiesced in the calling of the Assembly but issued a proc-
lamation in late June attempting to prohibit the initial meeting. See ALEXANDER F.
MITCHELL, THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY: ITS HISTORY AND STANDARDS 129-31
(Still Waters Revival Books ed. 1992) (1883).
125. ACTS & ORDS. INTERREGNUM, 180-84 (C.H. Firth & R.S. Rait eds. 1911)
(containing the Act of June 12, 1643, entitled: An Ordinance for the calling of an
Assembly of Learned and Godly Divines, to be consulted with by the Parliament, for
the setling [sic] of the Government of the Church).
126. See LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY II, supra note 56, at 821.
Further stating:
The Westminster Assembly, called to advise Parliament on religious ques-
tions and composed of clergy and laity, mostly Puritans with a sprinkling of
Episcopalians and Independents, and with Scottish commissioners ... con-
vened in July, 1643 .... [I]t drew up what is usually called the Westminster
Confession of Faith ... in November, 1646 .... To it the Westminster As-
sembly added a longer and a shorter catechism ....
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and represented the best of biblical and theological scholarship of the
day.127 When Parliament eventually received the Assembly's pro-
posed confession, it took no action other than debate. 28 Scotland's
parliament, however, following the recommendation of the General
Assembly of the Church of Scotland, approved all three standards in
1649.129 The Westminster Standards thus have a peculiar status; they
were never accepted in their country of origin but have had wide-
spread significance in the parts of the world where Presbyterianism
has taken root.13° For the purposes of this paper, however, the West-
minster Standards provide a benchmark of Puritan belief and defini-
tion of Puritan practice, which reduces the need to canvass earlier
individual Puritan theologians and preachers.1 3 1 Statements of doc-
trine and their moral implications found in the Westminster Standards
will be taken as representative of Puritan belief and practice.
3. Three Core Beliefs
The Westminster Standards are the most extensive confessional
standards generated in the Reformation.1 32 But as a platform for
identifying the connections between Puritanism and contract law, only
three core beliefs will be considered: the Puritan standard of author-
ity, the Puritan standard of morality, and the Puritan ethical
application.
a. The Puritan Standard of Authority
Puritanism's material principle was the Scriptures. 133 Neither tradi-
tion nor reason could stand over biblical revelation for the Puritan;
"the appeal to scriptural authority [was] the very life of Puritan-
127. See generally MITCHELL, supra note 124, at 118-27 (discussing the qualifica-
tions of those who served in the Assembly).
128. See LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY II, supra note 56, at 821 ("It
was methodically considered and debated in Parliament, was ordered printed, but was
never formally authorized by that body.").
129. Scot. Parl. Acts 16 (1649).
130. See LATOURETrE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY II, supra note 56, at 821 ("All
three [of the Westminster Standards] had extensive use in Presbyterian churches both
in Great Britain and America."); see also MITCHELL, supra note 124, at 469-70 ("The
Westminster Confession and Catechisms continued to be adhered to in Scotland ....
And, though cast out in Old England, they were taken in in the New, and in other
colonies beyond the Atlantic .... ).
131. See PLACHER, supra note 122, at 231.
132. The Second Helvetic Confession of Faith, drafted by Heinrich Bullinger of the
Reformed Church of Zurich in 1566, is longer than the Westminster Confession of
Faith standing alone but far shorter than the three Westminster Standards collectively.
See THE SECOND HELVETIC CONFESSION (1566), reprinted in 3 PHILIP SCHAFF, THE
CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM 831-909 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1877).
133. See THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH (1647), reprinted in 3 PHILIP
SCHAFF, THE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM 600-06 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1877).
The first chapter of the Westminster Confession of Faith is entitled "Of the Holy
Scripture." Id. at 599.
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ism.' 3 4 Contrary to the claims of Perry Miller,135 Puritans were not
beset by an overwhelming existential angst which only revelation
could salve. They were not closet rationalists who covered their tracks
with mountains of biblical citations.136 The Puritans really believed
that "[t]he whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for
• ..man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in
Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced
from Scripture. ' 137  Or, as the Westminster Larger Catechism suc-
cinctly puts it: "The holy scriptures of the old and new testament are
the word of God, and the only rule of faith and obedience."' 38
b. The Puritan Standard for Morality
The Puritan postulate of biblical authority generated the corollary
of freedom of conscience. 139 Mere external compliance with the
Scriptures was insufficient; conscience must concur with action. 140
Moreover, if Scripture alone were the only rule of faith and obedi-
ence, then neither state nor church could prescribe rules inconsistent
with Scripture: "God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it
free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in any
thing contrary to his Word, or beside it in matters of faith or wor-
ship."' 14' Yet, Puritans did not understand freedom of conscience to
be a license to live according to one's subjective preferences (even
preferences backed by money). The liberty countenanced in the Puri-
134. JOHN S. COOLIDGE, THE PAULINE RENAISSANCE IN ENGLAND: PURITANISM
AND THE BIBLE 1 (1970) ("Like Richard Hooker writing after him and lesser apolo-
gists for Conformity before, [John] Whitgift [Archbishop of Canterbury] gladly ac-
knowledges that the appeal to scriptural authority is the very life of Puritanism.").
135. PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND 7 (Beacon Press 1965) (1939)
("We may declare that Puritans universalized their own neurasthenia; they themselves
believed that their fears and anxieties came from clear-eyed perception of things as
they are."). "Mortals pursue illusions, and success inspires only disgust or despair
.... Puritans did not believe that they saw things in these terms merely because they
were victims of melancholia, but because such things were there to be seen." Id. at 8.
136. See COOLIDGE, supra note 134, at 2-3 (repudiating Miller's psychologizing of
Puritanism's penchant for Biblicism).
137. THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at 603.
138. THE LARGER CATECHISM, supra note 86, at 1 (emphasis added).
139. For a definition of "conscience," see the leading Puritan theologian of this
period, William Ames, in 1 WILLIAM AMES, CONSCIENCE WITH THE POWER AND
CASES THEREOF 1 (Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, Ltd. & Walter J. Johnson, Inc. 1975)
(1639) [hereinafter AMES, CONSCIENCE] ("The Conscience of man ...Is a mans
judgement [sic] of himselfe, [sic] according to the judgement [sic] of God of him.").
For Ames the work of conscience proceed syllogistically: the major premise was the
law of God, the minor premise is the facts confronting the moral agent, and "the
Conclusion of the relation that ariseth from our fact or state, by reason of that Law;
which is either guilt, or Spirituall [sic] Joy." Id. at 50.
140. Id. at 51-52 ("The power of Conscience is so great, that it maketh an action,
which in its owne [sic] nature is indifferent, to be either good or bad: and that which in
its owne [sic] nature is good, to be evill [sic] ....").
141. THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at 644 (footnotes
omitted).
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tan understanding was a freedom to live according to God's law.142
Moreover, the Puritan definition of freedom of conscience was ex-
pressly limited to matters of faith and worship; it did not include mat-
ters of state unrelated to those areas: "IT]hey who, upon pretense of
Christian liberty, shall oppose any lawful power, or the lawful exercise
of it, whether it be civil or ecclesiastical, resist the ordinance of
God."'1
43
Liberty of conscience has often been misunderstood as a synonym
for individualism. 144 Puritan "individualism" should be understood as
the subjection of an individual's conscience to the mandates of God or
God's temporal agents. Such submission, however, required princi-
pled reasons by which the conscience should be bound.145 Puritans
rejected the concept of implicit faith.146 Thus, Puritanism conjoined
the duty to engage in moral reasoning with obligation to follow the
results of that reasoning wherever those results led.
c. Puritan Promise Keeping
Puritan ethics were renowned for their precision. 147 Among the ob-
ligations demanded by freedom of conscience as understood by the
142. Id. Further stating:
They who, upon pretense of Christian liberty, do practice any sin, or cherish
any lust, do thereby destroy the end of Christian liberty; which is, that, being
delivered out of the hands of our enemies, we might serve the Lord without
fear, in holiness and righteousness before him, all the days of our life.
Id. (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 645 (footnote omitted); see also AMES, CONSCIENCE, supra note 139, at
51 ("Hence also it is, that though men be bound in Conscience before God, to obey
and keep the just Lawes [sic] of men after a just manner .... Yet those Lawes [sic] of
men, as they are mens Lawes, [sic] doe [sic] not bind the Conscience.").
144. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Puritanism and the Common Law, 45 AM. L. REV.
811, 815 (1911) ("What is peculiar to Anglo-American legal thinking, and above all to
American legal thinking, is an ultra-individualism .... It was Puritanism which gave
that added emphasis to individualist ideas in the formative period of our American
legal thought that has served to stamp them upon the science.").
145. See KNAPPEN, supra note 15, at 346-47. Further stating:
Almost equally important in the Puritan's makeup was the fine balance he
maintained between individualism and the needs of the social order ....
This individualism... did not necessarily mean the breaking-down of the
current social, economic, and political fabric.., so the Puritan could be an
individualist and still oppose usury, champion sumptuary regulations, and
insist on the right of the crown, clergy, and upper classes to rule the country.
The point was that he insisted that the individual must be given an intelligi-
ble reason for these restrictions, rather than accept them by blind faith.
Id.
146. See THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at 644 ("[T]he
requiring of an implicit faith, and an absolute and blind obedience, is to destroy lib-
erty of conscience, and reason also.") (footnotes omitted).
147. See, e.g., J. I. PACKER, A QUEST FOR GODLINESS: THE PURITAN VISION OF
THE CHRISTIAN LIFE 114 (1990). Quoting a perhaps apocryphal account:
Richard Rogers, the Puritan pastor of Wethersfield, Essex, at the turn of the
sixteenth century, was riding one day with the local lord of the manor, who,
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Puritans was keeping one's side of a bargain. Keeping one's promises
was an aspect of freedom of conscience because freedom of con-
science meant freedom to obey God's law. 148 Thus, if promise keep-
ing were enjoined by Scripture, not even state authority could lawfully
relieve one's obligation to perform. When analyzing the Eighth Com-
mandment, 49 the Westminster Larger Catechism puts it this way:
Q. [141.] What are the duties required in the eighth commandment?
A. The duties required in the eighth commandment are, truth,
faithfulness, and justice in contracts and commerce between man
and man; rendering to every one his due; restitution of goods unlaw-
fully detained from the right owners thereof; ....
Q. [142.] What are the sins forbidden in the eighth commandment?
A. The sins forbidden in the eighth commandment, besides the neg-
lect of the duties required, are, theft . . . fraudulent dealing ...
injustice and unfaithfulness in contracts between man and man, or in
matters of trust; oppression, extortion, usury, bribery, vexatious
lawsuits, unjust enclosures, and depopulations; engrossing commod-
ities to enhance the price ....
Thus, breaches of contract were moral issues for the Puritan, but
this is not to say that only breaches were moral issues. The broader
topics of justice and faithfulness in contracts were of fundamental eth-
ical concern.1 51
The leading legal scholar of the first half of the seventeenth century,
John Selden, held an uncompromising position on the absolute nature
of contractual undertakings:
after twitting him for some time about his 'precisian' ways, asked him what it
was that made him so precise. '0 sir,' replied Rogers, 'I serve a precise God.'
If there were such a thing as a Puritan crest, this would be its proper motto.
Id.
148. See THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at 644.
149. The Westminster Standards follow the typical Protestant numbering format
that identifies the commandment "Thou shalt not steal" as the Eighth.
150. THE LARGER CATECHISM, supra note 86, at 62-64 (emphasis added). No
other confessional standard of the Reformation period explicitly addresses contracts.
151. See THOMAS VINCENT, THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER As-
SEMBLY EXPLAINED AND PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE 194 (The Banner of Truth Trust
1980) (1674). Amplifying the Puritan understanding of the multiple implications of
the prohibition of theft, Vincent states:
The eighth commandment forbiddeth, in reference unto all men, any kind of
injustice and unrighteousness, in any of our dealings with them; such as-1.
Defrauding others in our buying, when we discommend that which we know
to be good, or take an advantage of others' ignorance of the worth of their
commodities, or their necessity of selling them, so as to give a great under-
rate for them .... 2. Defrauding others in selling, when we praise that
which we sell, and against our consciences say, It is excellent good, though
we know it to be stark naught; and when we take an unreasonable price for
out commodities ....
Id. While Vincent briefly mentions the sin of failure to perform one's contractual
undertaking, the burden of his directions concerning commercial transactions goes to
process and fairness, not absolute liability. Id. at 191.
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We must look to the contract; if that be rightly made, we must stand
to it; if we once grant [that] we may recede from contracts upon any
inconveniency that may afterwards happen, we shall have no bar-
gain kept .... [H]ow to make our contracts is left to ourselves; and
as we agree upon the conveyance of this house, or this land, so it
must be. If you offer me a hundred pounds for my glove, I tell you
what my glove is-a plain glove-pretend no virtue in it-the glove
is my own-I profess not to sell gloves, and we agree for an hun-
dred pounds-I do not know why I may not with a safe conscience
take it.
15 2
Selden cannot, however, be characterized as a Puritan. He gener-
ally supported the Parliamentary cause against the king, but Selden's
support for an Erastian church government (one in which Parliament
would be supreme) over presbyterianism or even episcopacy was
unwavering.
153
In contrast, Puritan theologians recognized even more than the
standard sorts of defenses to contract that would have succeeded at
common law. William Ames (1567-1633) was one of the early seven-
teenth century's leading Puritan theologians, even though he was
forced to spend much of his adult life in the Netherlands because of
his nonconformist views.15 4 Ames wrote extensively on a wide range
of theological and moral issues 155 which remained influential at the
Westminster Assembly a decade after his death.156 Ames addressed
the topic of contracts for over twenty pages in his Conscience and the
Cases Thereof 57 where he recognized that the moral obligation to
perform an obligation did not extend to those who lacked capacity
when making a promise; 5 8 where a promise was obtained by du-
152. Harold J. Berman, The Religious Sources of General Contract Law: An Histor-
ical Perspective, 4 J.L. & RELIGION 103, 118-19 (1986) (quoting SELDENIANA, OR THE
TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 37-38 (1789)). Selden's qualification as a Puri-
tan can be questioned. See, e.g., ALAN CROMARTIE, SIR MATHEW HALE 1609-1676:
LAW, RELIGION AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 40 (1995) ("It is entirely possible that
Selden was at heart a moral sceptic .... ). Yet Parliament chose him as one of the lay
assessors to the Puritan-dominated Westminster Assembly. See BIOGRAPHICAL Dic-
TIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW 470-71 (A. W. B. Simpson ed., 1984) [hereinafter
BIOGRAPHICAL DICrIONARY]; supra text accompanying notes 125-30; see also
MITCHELL, supra note 124, at xiii.
153. See generally 17 GEORGE SMITH, THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY
1150-62 (Sir Leslie Stephen & Sir Sidney Lee eds., 1921-1922) (containing biography
of John Selden (1584-1654)).
154. See KEITH L. SPRUNGER, THE LEARNED DOCTOR WILLIAM AMES 27 (1972)
("Silenced at home, Ames in 1610 began an exile in the Netherlands that lasted until
his death in 1633.").
155. See id. at 263-66 (containing a selected bibliography).
156. See id. at 259-60.
157. See 4 WILLIAM AMES, CONSCIENCE WITH THE POWER AND CASES THEREOF
227-48 (Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, Ltd. & Walter J. Johnson, Inc. 1975) (1639) (dis-
cussing contracts in three chapters).
158. Id. at 227 ("Hence Infants, mad men, and prodigals are not fit to make a Con-
tract .... ).
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ress, 159 fraud, 6 ° or mistake;' 6 ' where the contract was for an illegal
purpose 162 or where the contract was for the sale of an ecclesiastical
163
or judicial" office. Ames recognized the implied duty of good faith
in the performance of contracts 165 and the excuses of impracticabil-
159. Id. ("[T]he consent which is wrested by extreame feare, [sic] is not sufficient to
a firme [sic] Contract."). Recognizing that the fear sufficient to avoid a contract must
have been generated by the promisee, not external circumstances, Ames states:
That the feare [sic] is inferred to that end onely [sic] that consent might bee
[sic] forced. For if it should bee induced for another end, and hee [sic] which
is afraid to avoid that evill [sic] should make a contract, that contract will bee
of force: as if one being taken by a theife, [sic] should promise a summe [sic]
of money to bee freed, [sic] that feare was not the cause, but the occasion
onely of the contract.
Secondly, The feare must bee brought on unjustly. For if one out of feare
of punishment established by the lawes, [sic] should bargaine [sic] with him,
to whom hee hath done an injury, such a bargaine cannot bee disannulled.
Id. at 228.
160. Id. ("[T]hat promise which is drawne [sic] out by guile ... doth not properly
make a contract.").
161. Id. ("[T]hat promise which is ... given out of errour [sic] ... doth not properly
make a contract.").
162. See id.
Lawfull [sic] contracts are not properly exercised, but about lawfull things
... Because in every contract, consent is given: but consent to an unlawfull
[sic] thing is sinne [sic].
... [Ilt is not lawfull to promise, what is not lawfull to performe [sic].
... [N]o obligation can bee [sic] lawfull which obligeth [sic] to sinne because
... it is repugnant to the obligation of the Divine law.
Id.
163. Id. at 229.
Contracts of buying, and selling, and those which are of the same nature
have no place in some things: not because they are not lawfull [sic] or good
in themselves, but because they are so good that they cannot bee [sic]
valewed [sic] at a price.
... Hence it is a sinne [sic] of Simony, to buy or sell, or any way change a
holy and Spirituall, [sic] for a Temporall [sic] ....
Id.
164. Id. at 230-31 ("And although there is not in every respect a parity, yet there is
some similitude, and proportion betwixt things sacred and publique [sic] offices,
which have the power of jurisdiction. For the sale of such offices, hath a dishonest
corruptnesse, [sic] which thwarts the nature of them.").
165. Id. at 231-32.
The internall forme [sic] of a lawfull [sic] Contract, is upright dealing, by
which one doth sincerely intend to oblige himselfe [sic] to the performance,
of that which hee [sic] promiseth, and afterwards to performe [sic] it as
much, as in him lieth. The reason is, because a Contract includes a promis-
sive consent. Now a promise is a testimony, by which one binds his faith to
deale [sic] uprightly with another in the performance of this or that; and
therefore the forme doth require internall, [sic] and essentiall [sic] the up-
right dealing of the Contracter, [sic] to bee [sic] true, and sincere.
... Hence that division of Contracts; by which some are said to bee accord-
ing to upright meaning [and] others to bee according to the strictnesse [sic]
of the law, is not accurate, and hath not place either in the Court of Con-
science, or before God.
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ity'66 and changed circumstances, as s the defense of failure of
a constructive condition (including anticipatory repudiation).68
While Ames may have been influenced by the civil law tradition, he
stands as a noteworthy representative of Puritan thinking on the mo-
rality not only of promise-keeping but also on the morality of making
and avoiding contracts. 1
69
Id. at 231. Ames further understood that good faith was a tool by which contractual
obligations could be tempered:
For upright meaning is required in all Contracts, and because the chiefest
[sic] part of the nature of Contracts doth consist in that, the judgement [sic]
as farre [sic] as it can appeare [sic], is to bee [sic] given out of that, and
according to it. Therefore in all Contracts, wee [sic] should proceed accord-
ing to right, and good, not the letters, or extreame [sic] rigour [sic] of the
law, in which often times the most extreame injury is found.
Id. at 231-32.
166. Id. at 232 ("Sometimes not to stand to promises, is not repugnant to honest
meaning; to wit, when the promise leaves off to bind: . . . [i]f the thing promised
becomes unprofitable, unlawfull, [sic] or impossible.").
167. Id.
Sometimes not to stand to promises, is not repugnant to honest meaning; to
wit, when the promise leaves off to bind: .... If the state of the things and
persons is so changed, that in the judgement [sic] of wisemen, the promiser is
thought, that hee [sic] would not have comprehended such an event.
Id.
168. Id. ("Sometimes not to stand to promises, is not repugnant to honest meaning;
to wit, when the promise leaves off to bind: ... [i]f hee [sic] which promised on the
other side, will not fulfill his promise.").
169. The earlier Puritan theologian William Perkins (who had been one of Ames's
teachers) fully embraced the Aristotelian-Medieval concept of equity as a tool for
avoiding the rigors of the application of the law.
According to Perkins, equity, or moderation, is a virtue which is essential for
peace in every human society .... Public equity has to do with the proper
application of the law under particular circumstances.
Public equity includes consideration of two things: the extremity of the law
and mitigation of the law. The extremity of the law refers to the strict appli-
cation of the latter in its literal and most precise sense without any relaxation
of the prescribed penalties for "good and convenient" reasons. When there
are no mitigating circumstances, strict application of the law is just. When
such conditions are present, however, adherence to the letter of the law is
"flat injustice."
E. Clinton Gardner, Justice in the Puritan Covenantal Tradition, in THE ANNUAL OF
THE SOCIETY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 91, 100-01 (D. M. Yeager et al. eds., 1988). Forty
years later, Puritan writer Thomas Vincent made similar and additional points about
morality in contracting in VINCENT, supra note 151, at 194. Vincent states:
Q. 4. What doth the eighth commandment forbid in reference unto all men?
A. The eighth commandment forbiddeth, in reference unto all men, any
kind of injustice and unrighteousness, in any of our dealings with them; such
as-1. Defrauding others in our buying, when we discommend that which we
know to be good, or take an advantage of others' ignorance of the worth of
their commodities, or their necessity of selling them, so as to give a great
under-rate for them .... 2. Defrauding others in selling, when we praise
that which we sell, and against our consciences say, It is excellent good,
though we know it to be stark naught; and when we take an unreasonable
price for our commodities ....
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B. Covenant in Puritan Theology
1. Introduction to Covenant Theology
Of all of their contributions to the development of theological doc-
trine, the Puritan analysis of covenant stands supreme.' 70 The subject
of God's covenant with man occupies an entire chapter of the West-
minster Confession of Faith.17 1 "Covenant" in Puritan theology is the
term for the all-encompassing relationship(s) between God and hu-
manity. God was not simply the creator and sustainer of all that ex-
isted; he also related to his human creatures in a particular, personal,
and voluntary way called Covenant.172 The Puritan emphasis on cove-
nant stands in sharp relief against the other Calvinist-influenced con-
fessional statements which did not give it so prominent a place.
173
Instead of emphasizing covenant as Puritanism's unique theological
contribution, some might suggest that the doctrine of predestination
was the hallmark of Puritan theology. 174 However, the latter cannot
be sustained because predestination (or election) had been a promi-
nent element of Reformed thought long before the Puritans.175 Yet,
the Puritans were to develop in depth the relationship between elec-
tion and covenant.
The Westminster Confession of Faith posits two divine-human cove-
nants. The first was the Covenant of Works whereby Adam as the
federal 176 representative of all humanity was promised eternal life
170. See MILLER, supra note 135, at 366 ("[B]etween 1600 and 1650, English Puri-
tans were compelled, in order to preserve the truths already known, to add to their
theology at least one that hitherto had not been known, or at least not emphasized,
the doctrine of the Covenant of Grace."); see also Witte, supra note 94, at 581 ("In the
later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Puritan theologians in England and
America-in alliance with Continental Protestants-transformed the covenant into
one of the cardinal doctrines of theology.").
171. See THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at 616-17.
172. Id. at 616. Stating further:
The distance between God and the creature is so great that although reason-
able creatures do owe obedience unto him as their Creator, yet they could
never have any fruition of him as their blessedness and reward but by some
voluntary condescension on God's part, which he hath been pleased to ex-
press by way of covenant.
Id.
173. See, e.g., THE BELGIC CONFESSION (1561), reprinted in 3 PHILIP SCHAFF, THE
CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM 383-486 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1877); THE HEIDEL-
BERG CATECHISM OR PALATINATE CATECHISM (1563), reprinted in 3 PHILIP SCHAFF,
THE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM 307-55 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1877); THE
THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES OF RELIGION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND (1571), re-
printed in 3 PHILIP SCHAFF, THE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM 486-515 (New York,
Harper & Bros. 1877).
174. See infra text accompanying notes 183-209.
175. See, e.g., THE BELGIC CONFESSION, supra note 173, at 401-02; THE THIRTY-
NINE ARTICLES OF RELIGION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, supra note 173, at 497.
176. See THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at 617. Chap-
ter VII.ii of THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH mandated satisfaction of a
condition of "perfect and personal obedience" on Adam's part for the benefit of all
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"upon condition of perfect and personal obedience. "177 In other
words, the Confession teaches that Adam and all of humanity after
him would never have died and would have enjoyed perfect commu-
nion with God had Adam not eaten the fruit of the tree of the knowl-
edge of good and evil in the Garden of Eden. 178 The Covenant of
Works was thus reminiscent of the typical contractual relationship
with which the common lawyers would have been familiar. Second,
the Westminster Confession identifies the Covenant of Grace which
promised sinful humanity salvation from their fallen state by requiring
faith in Jesus Christ. 179 The nature of the requirement of faith had
proved troublesome. Was faith akin to the work required from Adam
in Eden, albeit of a reduced scale? Or was faith merely a condition?
To put the question in contemporary terms: Did the Puritans under-
stand the Covenant of Grace as an offer of a unilateral contract (ac-
cepted by performance of faith)? Or was the Covenant of Grace a
conditional gift? And, if the latter, how (and by whom) was the condi-
tion satisfied?
2. The Relationship Between the Covenant of
Grace and Predestination
The theological conflicts over the nature of the Covenant of Grace
revolved around an axis framed by the question (in early seventeenth
century terms): Was the Covenant of Grace bilateral or unilateral?
humanity. Id. Puritan covenant theology is frequently identified as "federal" theol-
ogy derived from the Latin word for covenant, foedus, used in theological writings.
Id
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., VINCENT, supra note 151, at 52. Vincent states:
Q. 5. What was the promise of the covenant of works which God made with
man?
A. The promise of the covenant of works was a promise of life; for God's
threatening death upon man's disobedience (Gen. ii. 17), implieth his prom-
ise of life upon man's obedience.
Q. 6. What life was it that God promised to man in the covenant of works?
A. The life that God promised to man in the covenant of works was the
continuance of natural and spiritual life, and the donation of eternal life.
Q. 7. Wherein doth natural, spiritual, and eternal life consist?
A. 1. Natural life doth consist in the union of the soul and body. 2. Spiritual
life doth consist in the union of God and the soul. 3. Eternal life doth con-
sist in the perfect, immutable, and eternal happiness, both of soul and body,
through a perfect likeness unto, and an immediate vision and fruition of
God, the chief good.
Id.
179. THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at 617. Further
stating:
Man by his fall [into sin] having made himself incapable of life by that cove-
nant [of works], the Lord was pleased to make a second, commonly called
the covenant of grace: wherein he freely offered unto sinners life and salva-
tion by Jesus Christ, requiring of them faith in him that they may be saved
Id. (footnotes omitted).
2005]
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW
Or, as restated above, was the Covenant of Grace a unilateral contract
or a conditional gift? The doctrine of predestination made a solution
to this challenge necessary. On the one hand, the Westminster Confes-
sion provided for a Covenant of Grace in which faith played a pivotal
role.180 Faith, as understood by the Puritans, was a passive human
action (of accepting, receiving, and resting), but it was, nonetheless, a
virtue that individuals exercised. 181 On the other hand, the Confes-
sion taught that God had predestined a specific number of fallen
human beings to enjoy eternal life with him.1 82 Thus, if a specific
number of human beings were predestined, what was the place of
faith? Conversely, if the temporal exercise of faith were the condition
of enjoying the benefits of the Covenant of Grace, how was eternal
predestination to be understood? Two solutions to this apparent
problem have been proposed.
a. The Psychological Answer of Perry Miller
In the mid-twentieth century, Perry Miller proposed a resolution to
this conundrum in his classic work, The New England Mind.'83 Al-
though Miller's work was the first of a series on the two centuries of
development of the topic of his title,18" by beginning with the Puritans
of New England, he was forced to spend a great deal of time on the
Puritans of old England.' 85 As we shall see, Miller's dialectical ap-
proach to the subject of covenant and predestination continues to ex-
ercise an enormous influence over subsequent analysis of the issue
even when old England alone is the field of concern.
Puritanism for Miller was an example of Augustinian Christian-
ity.' 86 Augustinian Christianity, in Miller's view, was not so much
characterized by doctrine but by a particular form of piety, one in
which God, human sin, and redemption had an existential claim on a
180. See id. at 617, 630-31 (devoting a chapter to the discussion of faith).
181. See id. at 630-31 ("[T]he principal acts of saving faith are accepting, receiving,
and resting upon Christ alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life, by vir-
tue of the covenant of grace.") (footnotes omitted).
182. See id. at 608-09. Stating further:
III. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and
angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to
everlasting death.
IV. These angels and men, thus predestinated and foreordained, are particu-
larly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite
that it can not be either increased or diminished.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
183. MILLER, supra note 135.
184. See id. at vii ("I offer this as the first volume in a projected series upon the
intellectual history of New England to extend through the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries .... ").
185. See generally id.
186. See id. at 3-4 (summarizing the parallels between Augustine's and the Puri-
tans' deeply passionate search for security in God).
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person's being that challenges one's capacity for empathy in the pre-
sent age:
Piety was the inspiration for Puritan heroism and the impetus in the
charge of Puritan Ironsides; it also made sharp the edge of Puritan
cruelty and justified the Puritan in his persecution of disagreement.
It inspired Puritan idealism and encouraged Puritan snobbery. It
was something that men either had or had not, it could not be
taught or acquired. It was foolishness and fanaticism to their oppo-
nents, but to themselves[,] it was life eternal.187
Yet, Augustinianism, in general, and Puritanism, in particular, held
to some specific doctrines, particularly predestination. Any group, ac-
cording to Miller, that tries to live so close to such an emotional edge
while maintaining the doctrine of election is bound to be torn in two
opposing directions. On the one hand, there were those who rejected
predestination because it was "devoid of any grounds for moral obli-
gation: what duties could be exacted from ordinary men when every-
thing depended upon" '188 God?' 89 Miller characterizes this group as
Arminians because they rejected the "stark predestination of early
Calvinism" and sought to soften God's decree of election by placing
the condition of faith firmly in human hands. 190 On the other hand,
there were those who were so certain of their election that they felt no
need for any continuing need for discipline to God's law or any place
for the ministrations of the church. This group, the Antinomians,
Miller describes as possessing "an uncontrolled piety without the in-
dispensable ballast of reason."'91 Such persons "made [God] a vital,
all-pervading spirit, mystically indwelling in all men, or at least in the
elect, uniting them to Himself, obliterating their individualities."'
By contrast, from the Puritan point of view, "Arminianism made
[God] too rational and too human, altogether too amenable to what
man thinks is just and equitable."' 93 With what Miller perceived to be
threats from the right and the left, Puritan theologians needed a tool
to prevail in their continuing efforts to discipline their followers and
order the larger society.
Miller asserted that Puritan theologians developed the doctrine of
the Covenant of Grace to solve the problem of mediating between the
extremes of Arminianism and Antinomianism. In response to the Ar-
minian, Miller asserted that the Puritan Covenant of Grace was "un-
derstood [as] just such a contract as was used among men of business,
a bond or a mortgage, an agreement between two parties, signed and
187. Id. at 5.
188. Id. at 367.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 386.
191. Id. at 373.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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sworn to, and binding upon both." '1 94 While it remained true that God
elected some, he did so by offering everyone a deal they could not (or
should not) refuse-eternal life in return for mere faith:
Though grace and faith come entirely from God, yet because they
are tendered through natural means and reasonable inducements,
which all can grasp ... men have of themselves the power to turn
their backs upon the grace of God .... [Thus] no man of ordinary
intelligence should continue unconverted, if only on the grounds of
self-interest ....195
By his recapitulation of the Covenant of Grace, Miller attempted to
describe what he perceived as the mechanism by which Puritans main-
tained the sovereignty of God while allowing a place for the human
will: "The Covenant was a gift of God, yet it entailed responsibility on
Him as well as upon men."1 96 The Covenant of Grace was also effec-
tive against the Antinomian side because every covenant, as the com-
mon law taught,1 97 imported duties of discipline and order:
Therefore [God] fixes upon this scheme [the Covenant of Grace]
that there should be on the side of man a voluntary return, a sincere
pledge that will have some elements of spontaneity. He made both
the Covenants "conditional", [sic] that of Grace no less than that of
Works, so that they would be relations founded upon mutual stipu-
lations .... 198
The mutual stipulations on the human side of the Covenant of
Grace turned out to be the law of God, what Miller characterized as
the Covenant of Works. 19 9 Thus, the Antinomian, no matter how sure
of her election, was not freed from the obligations the expression of
which could not help but bring the individual's life into a mode of
discipline and a society into good order.
As attractive as Miller's dialectical development of the Covenant of
Grace may be, it founders upon closer examination of the original
sources.2 ° ° Yet, this paper has engaged in this long recapitulation of
Miller's explanation because it still forms the underlying premises of
what little legal literature there is that analyzes Puritan contributions
194. Id. at 375.
195. Id. at 393.
196. Id. at 378.
197. See id. at 374 (crediting the common law understanding of covenant with a
significant role in the development of the Puritan doctrine of the Covenant of Grace).
198. Id. at 382-83.
199. See id. at 384.
In order that men should not presume upon the "Absolute Promises" of the
Covenant to give over trying, the federal God, who is exceedingly shrewd,
perfected the adroit device of incorporating the Covenant of Works into the
Covenant of Grace, not as the condition of salvation but as the rule of
righteousness.
Id.
200. See infra text accompanying notes 210-34.
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to the common law. In his 1987 piece, Blest Be the Ties That Bind:
Covenant and Community in Puritan Thought,"0 ' John Witte engages
in a lengthy exposition of alleged Puritan "spiritual commercialism,"
which he asserts came to dominate theological discourse. 2  Witte fol
lows Miller closely when he argues that the Puritans transformed the
formerly unilateral Covenant of Grace into a voluntary bilateral con-
tract in which faith was the quid pro quo of the blessing of eternal
life.2 °3 Such a reorientation of the earlier Reformers' understanding
of the Covenant of Grace would have had, according to Witte, impli-
cations for individual social interaction:
The new covenant theology also provided the cardinal ethical prin-
ciple of Puritanism that each person was free to choose his act, but
once having chosen, was bound to perform that act, regardless of
the consequences. This ethical principle was deduced directly from
the new understanding of the covenant of grace.20 4
From his understanding of the individual applications of the Puritan
doctrine of the Covenant of Grace, Witte extrapolates to Puritan so-
cial theory. According to Witte, not only did the Puritans believe that
failure to keep one's word was a sin, they "believed that adherence to
covenants and agreements was essential to maintain social cohesion
and harmony. "205 Miller's understanding of the Covenant of Grace
thus formed the basis on which Witte could conclude that "the doc-
trine of covenant unified the Puritans' concepts of the individual and
of the community."2 6 Society's very existence depended on promise
keeping. From this platform, it was only a short step to read Puritan
theology into the common law of contracts, especially the indepen-
dence of mutual promises. Harold Berman has taken this step in Law
201. Witte, supra note 94.
202. See id. at 589. Witte states:
What traditionally had been treated as God's gift of faith and salvation to his
predestined became, in Puritan theology, a bargained contract. What tradi-
tionally had been understood as God's covenant faithfulness to man became
God's contractual obligation to man. This "spiritual commercialism" . . .
became a trademark of many brands of Puritan covenant theology in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Id.
203. See id. at 586-87. Witte further states:
Early Protestant writers-Calvin, Zwingli, and Bullinger-had described the
covenant of grace primarily as God's merciful gift to his elect .... Man, in
his sin, could not demand God's gracious covenant gift or bind God by it
once it was conferred. He could simply accept it in gratitude ....
Several Puritan writers, by contrast, described the covenant of grace as a
bargained contract, voluntarily formed by God and his elect, and absolutely
binding on both parties.
Id.
204. Id. at 595.
205. Id. at 597.
206. Id. at 599.
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and Revolution 11207 where he construes Paradine v. Jane2" 8 as a dis-
tinctively "Puritan" decision.20 9 However, to the extent that Miller's
thesis about the significance of the doctrine of the Covenant of Grace
is called into question, the justification for the conclusions of Witte
and Berman on the influence of Puritan covenant theology on con-
tract law is weakened.
b. The Theological Answer of John Von Rohr
Miller's thesis came under attack in 1970 with George Marsden's
Perry Miller's Rehabilitation of the Puritans: A Critique.21 ° Marsden
criticized Miller's characterizations of Puritan beliefs and claimed that
those mischaracterizations contributed "to a basic distortion of one of
the most crucial of Puritan concerns, their doctrine of the cove-
nant." '211 Miller is faulted, among other things, for misconstruing the
purpose and nature of the Covenant of Grace in Puritan theology.
The purpose for the covenant concept, according to Miller, was to in-
ject human responsibility into a system of absolute Calvinism, rather
than to acknowledge a biblical doctrine. 212 The nature of the Cove-
nant of Grace, in Miller's rehabilitation, turned it into a means for
people to contribute something to their salvation, which was contrary
to the claims of the Puritans themselves.213
207. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II, supra note 17, at 280-81.
208. See 82 Eng. Rep. 519 (K.B. 1647) (reporting by Style); 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.
1647) (reporting by Alden).
209. See BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II, supra note 17, at 281; see also Harold
J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From
Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 462 (1996) ("The adoption of the doctrine of
absolute contractual liability [in Paradine] reflected a Puritan belief in the sanctity of
covenants as well as a mercantile emphasis on security of bargained transactions.").
210. George M. Marsden, Perry Miller's Rehabilitation of the Puritans: A Critique,
39 CHURCH HISTORY 91 (1970).
211. Id. at 93 (pointing out that this result was due to a modification of four areas
of Puritan belief: Puritan biblicism, doctrinal formulations, emphasis on the place of
Christ, and their Calvinism).
212. See id. at 99.
It is of course possible that he is correct in suggesting that the covenant
became popular in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries because of the
appeal of contractualism to the spirit of the age and because of its usefulness
in explaining man's responsibilities to a sovereign God. The simpler expla-
nation, and the one the Puritans themselves would have given, however,
seems far more probable. The covenant doctrine was emphasized primarily
because it was discovered to be a central biblical concept. It was emphasized
. . . because the Protestant Reformers studied the whole Scripture inten-
sively and demanded that it all be taken seriously ....
Id.
213. Id. at 100 ("His implication is that New England ministers were informing
their congregations that if they tried to fulfill the moral law they would contribute
something to their salvation. But this would be the exact opposite of what the Puri-
tans actually said about the covenant of grace."); see also Gardner, supra note 169, at
91 (faulting Miller because he "interpreted covenantal... theology as an attempt to
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Michael McGiffert has also challenged Miller's contractualist inter-
pretation of the Puritan doctrine of the Covenant of Grace and in-
stead affirmed that the Covenant was absolute; the conditions of the
Covenant were, in the final analysis, satisfied by the gift of God.214
William Stoever further criticized Miller's presumption of human par-
ticipation in satisfying the covenant conditions because such a pre-
sumption unnecessarily abridged the reality of divine sovereignty in
the Covenant. Stoever asserted that a close dialectical relationship
characterized covenantal conditionality and divine sovereignty. 21 5
The real distinction for the Puritans was between merit and grace.
The Puritans rejected the former without simultaneously rejecting the
reality of human activity.216
One of the most sustained attacks on Miller's rehabilitation (or do-
mestication) of the Puritans came in 1986 with the publication of John
von Rohr's The Covenant of Grace in Puritan Thought.217 For von
Rohr, the Puritan focus on the Covenant of Grace was not a psycho-
logical crutch but a theological conclusion, 218 and he notes that a
proper evaluation of the doctrine of the Covenant must appreciate its
fundamental theological dimension. In other words, Von Rohr rejects
an either/or interpretation of the human and divine activities in the
Covenant of Grace in favor of a both/and explanation.219 Von Rohr
repeatedly drives home his thesis that the Puritan Covenant of Grace
was unilateral and absolute as well as bilateral and conditional.220
Von Rohr traces Miller's error to a faulty conception of the contri-
bution of the two Reformed streams of thought about the Covenant,
the Genevan and Rhineland, into the Puritan understanding.
Whatever differences in emphasis and even tension that existed be-
tween the Reformed approaches to the Covenant of Grace, they did
resolve the antinomy in Calvinist doctrine between determinism and human freedom
by making salvation dependent upon good works").
214. See JOHN VON ROHR, THE COVENANT OF GRACE IN PURITAN THOUGHT 29
(1986).
215. See id. at 29-30.
216. Id. at 29-30 ("[T]he doctrine of divine sovereignty is not abridged by an ad-
mission of human participation, and Stoever is critical of Miller and others who affirm
the necessity of such a conclusion.").
217. Id. at 19 (asserting that "Miller's account is seriously in error").
218. Id. at 17 ("Miller's fundamental thesis is that the covenant concept was devel-
oped by Puritan theologians as a 'device' for rectifying certain deficiencies in the the-
ological system of John Calvin .. . and for gaining the psychological sense of
assurance which these changes could bring.").
219. Id. ("The covenant of grace was both conditional and absolute."); id. at 81-82
(describing exegesis of texts supporting the conclusion that "Puritan theology rejected
... the 'either/or' and affirmed a 'both/and,' with the connecting link found in the
fulfillment of the conditions themselves").
220. Von Rohr variously speaks in terms of a "duality," of being "conjoined," of a
"connection" or "reconciliation," and of a "concurrence." Id. at 1, 33, 53, 152.
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not conflict. 221 The doctrines of divine sovereignty and predestination
were the common property of the entire Reformed tradition, includ-
ing the Rhineland school under Heinrich Bullinger, and were not lim-
ited to the Genevan school under John Calvin.222 Calvin's doctrine of
the Covenant was not devoid of conditionality223 and Bullinger's Cov-
enant had an absolute dimension.224
According to Von Rohr, the conditional human and the absolute
divine elements could comfortably coexist within Puritan thought be-
cause they conceived that "the divine agency worked through the
human agency and ... their working was ... one of concurrence. 225
The divine element did not abolish or disregard the human but instead
enabled and enhanced it.22 6 Von Rohr's primary focus is on the need
221. See id. at 32-33 (discussing views of original and secondary sources on subject
of alleged antinomy within the Reformed tradition).
222. Id. at 2 ("Standing firmly in the continental Reformed tradition, Puritan think-
ers spoke unhesitatingly of God's sovereignty, the eternal decrees, and divine
predestination.").
223. See id. at 19 ("Calvin's theology was not unmindful of the covenant of grace
and . . . God's mercy is a committed mercy and calls for a committed response.").
224. See id. at 31. Von Rohr states:
The Rhineland [i.e., Bullinger] reformers were predestinarians, and their
contribution to Puritan thought thus included a theology of divine as well as
human act .... [T]o portray the nature of their influence as leading simply
to a bilateralism is to reduce predestination for Puritanism itself to mere
theory and to ignore the divine agency in the process of salvation which a
doctrine of election entails. Such sterilizing of the predestination conviction,
however, was hardly a part of either Puritan thought or religious
consciousness.
Id.; see also id. at 193. Stating further:
Thus the covenant of grace for Bullinger was a conditional covenant ....
And yet, though this element of conditionality was central, the covenant was
not understood by Bullinger in terms reminiscent of the "pact" of late medi-
eval nominalism with its semi-Pelagian optimism and its tendency toward a
purely legalistic quid pro quo. For Bullinger the conditional covenant re-
sided within the context of the Reformation doctrine of ... single predesti-
nation, God's election of some for salvation.
Id.
225. Id. at 152.
226. Id. at 114-15 ("[P]redestination does not abolish human action, but enhances
it, for the divine and the human must go together in fulfillment of covenant condi-
tions."); see also id. at 152. Stating further:
On the whole.., when God's doing was emphasized... God's actions are in
no way pictured as disregardful of the human subjects, with their capacities
and characteristics of personal life, through whom these actions occur. If
one emphasis is that "God works in us," a second immediately follows: "God
works by us."
Id. The need for both actors resides in the Puritan strong belief in human depravity
and human inability. See id. at 82. Stating further:
This need for God's absolute help in the fulfilling of covenant conditions is
due to the impotence for good which characterizes humanity's fallen state
.... Thus the doctrine of depravity made impact here upon Puritan cove-
nant understanding. To affirm unaided capacity for faith and repentance
would be horrendous heresy, the theological folly variously designated Pela-
gian, Papist, or Arminian.
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to uphold the absolute along with the conditional in the face of the
tendency of Miller (and many following after him) to perceive the lat-
ter while remaining insensitive to the former.2 7
Finally, in a more recent discussion of decretal and covenant theol-
ogy, Jan van Vliet has also challenged the tendency of much of mod-
ern scholarship to follow Miller's presumption of a conflict between a
purely conditional Covenant of Grace and unconditional predestina-
tion.22 8 He observes that "Calvin discovered no discernable opposi-
tion, inherent contradiction, or even tension between [the two
doctrines of predestination and covenant]."22 9 William Ames, one of
the most influential Puritan divines in early federal theology,2 30 ac-
cepted a coexistence of both an absolute divine decree and a condi-
tional divine-human covenant.2 3 1 A result of Miller's "reading in" an
unnecessary conflict within Puritan thought has been a tendency to
evaluate Puritan doctrine, particularly in its advanced representation
in the Westminster Standards, as the triumph of the decrees of predes-
tination (absolute) over the covenant (conditional) where, in fact, no
battle was fought.2 32 Van Vliet concludes with a warning against read-
ing "doctrinal incongruity and antipathy" as the trademarks of the de-
velopment of the Reformed confessional tradition. 33 The trend of
Id.; see also Gardner, supra note 169, at 93 ("Since fallen humanity is unable to initi-
ate faith, God freely bestows saving grace upon the elect . . . . Apart from grace,
humanity is unable either to believe or to obey the law.").
227. See VON ROHR, supra note 214. Stating further:
Some ... tendencies in Miller's analysis have subsequently been carried to
more extreme form in other, less thorough, presentations of Puritan cove-
nant thought. Such popularizations of his views have mainly lifted up the
theme of the covenant conditions and the obligation for their fulfillment,
painting upon Puritanism an Arminian coloration of the type it so rigorously
opposed .... Ralph Barton Perry declared, "Through the covenant theol-
ogy the New England Puritans were possessed of the more congenial creed
that God helps those who help themselves." Thus the Miller legacy has in
these instances lost all sense of the continuing Calvinism in Puritan covenant
thought.
Id. at 21-22 (footnote omitted).
228. See Jan van Vliet, Decretal Theology and the Development of Covenant
Thought: An Assessment of Cornelis Graafland's Thesis with a Particular View to Fed-
eral Architects William Ames and Johannes Cocceius, 63 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL
J. 393 (2001).
229. Id. at 394.
230. Id. ("[W]e have chosen to examine the contributions of William Ames and
Johannes Cocceius because these two individuals, more than any other theologians in
the history of the development of Reformed orthodoxy, have been responsible for the
construction of the early architecture of what we now designate the federal
theology.").
231. Id. at 418 ("Cocceius formalized something that already existed earlier in Wil-
liam Ames's teaching, the comfortable coexistence of decree and covenant .... ).
232. Id. at 398 ("[S]uch representation of the [Westminster] Divines' position [as
the victory of predestination over covenant theology] serves to unfairly overshadow
the Confession's generally acknowledged superb teaching on covenant theology.").
233. Id. at 420. Van Vliet further states:
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modern Puritan scholarship thus undercuts the tendency of Perry
Miller and his modern disciples to create a division within Puritanism
and then absolutize one pole or the other. The Puritan understanding
of the relationship between God and humanity was not commercial or
contractarian. While human covenantal obligations were real, the di-
vine initiative was the foundation of the Covenant and provided the
platform on which the benefits of Covenant obedience could be
enjoyed.
C. Discipline in Puritan Living
In The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State
in Early Modern Europe,"' Philip Gorski argues that each of the
three confessional strands of European Christianity-Lutheran, Re-
formed, and Catholic-were engaged in "disciplinary revolutions." '235
Of the three confessional traditions, Gorski observes that the disci-
pline of the Reformed or Calvinistic strand was more intensive 236 and
its effects deeper. 237 England became one of the most orderly and
powerful early modern states due to the depth of the impact of its
Puritan Reformed discipline.238 Three facets of Reformed discipline
contributed to Puritanism's impact on English society: self-discipline,
church discipline, and public discipline. 239 While self-discipline and
[S]cholars of Reformed orthodoxy must be disabused of the specious notion
that doctrinal incongruity and antipathy represent the trademark ... of the
development of the Reformed confessional tradition. Such an ill-conceived
postulate betrays the revisionist capabilities of "decretal theology" and, as
such, should be considered an assault on well-established Reformed histori-
ography, particularly through the period of Reformed orthodoxy. It does a
great disservice to the legacy of those individuals who contributed to the
development of a system, it is a contrived interpretation untrue to historical
fact, and it is consequently a concept whose legitimacy must be challenged.
Id.
234. GORSKI, supra note 18.
235. Id. at xvii (stating that disciplining practices can be observed in Calvinist,
Catholic, and Lutheran contexts).
236. See id. at xi ("[Sjocial-disciplining was a great deal more intensive in the Cal-
vinist parts of Europe than in Lutheran and Catholic regions."); id. at xvii ("[Tihe
social-disciplining process went further and faster in the Calvinist polities . . . ."); see
also BENEDICT, supra note 21, at 486. Benedict states:
Comparing the Reformed to the other two major post-Reformation church
families, however, it would appear that the Reformed churches had the most
vigorous disciplinary systems .... They exercised a more continuous over-
sight of church members' behavior than did the visitation systems of most
Lutheran and Catholic churches-or the church courts of England ....
BENEDICT, supra note 21, at 486.
237. GORSKI, supra note 18, at x ("My argument ... is that the Reformation un-
leashed a profound and far-reaching process of disciplining-a disciplinary revolution
. .and that the effects of this revolution were deepest and most dramatic in the
Calvinist parts of Europe.").
238. Id. at xvii (noting that England was among the most orderly and powerful
early modem states because it experienced a Calvinist disciplinary revolution).
239. Id. at 20-21.
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church discipline were of primary importance to the Puritans for their
religious significance, these disciplines are also important for their his-
torical implications for society, the law, and the state. This impor-
tance is only heightened by the inseparability of religion from society
and the state, especially in the context of an established church.240
1. Internalization
The Puritan understanding of discipline, like all its Reformed sib-
lings, was zealous to emphasize that the goal of all discipline was con-
formity to scriptural law.24 ' The most important type of discipline was
spiritual, and spiritual growth was manifested by an inward obedi-
ence-a voluntary submission of an individual's desires to God's
moral law.242 Because inward obedience was not immediate, its culti-
vation required various practices. 243 This ideal of self-discipline was
aimed at the heart, and produced a change in the moral character of
many of its advocates.244 Not simply outward conformity but inner
virtue was Puritanism's ultimate concern. 45
The goal of internal discipline explains the informal and nonjudicial
practices of discipline employed by the Puritans. Perceived wide-
240. Id. at 3 (cautioning against "treating religion and politics as fundamentally dif-
ferent things .... For at perhaps no other time in European history were religion
and politics more tightly intertwined than in the two centuries following the
Reformation.").
241. See id. at 20 ("[T]he Calvinists ... gave particular emphasis to the conformity
of the church-and indeed of the entire political community-with scriptural law.").
242. Id. ("Spiritual growth, Calvin believed, was manifested in the attainment of
'voluntary' and 'inward' obedience, a natural harmony between morality and desire.")
(footnote omitted).
243. Id. ("For the individual believer discipline was... a practical [problem], and
Calvinists invented a variety of techniques for achieving it: regular Bible reading,
daily journals, moral log books, and rigid control over time. Thus, Calvinism propa-
gated new ethics and practices of self-discipline.") (footnote omitted); see also HILL,
SOCIETY AND PURITANISM, supra note 6, at 204 (observing that Puritan preachers
adjured their public to engage in daily scrutiny of their own conduct).
244. See, e.g., BENEDICT, supra note 21, at 429 ("The theology of Zwingli, Bullinger,
and Calvin all accorded greater attention to personal sanctification than Luther's.");
id. at 488 (observing evidence of the successful inward nature of this self-discipline in
the late seventeenth century in church members: "spontaneously confessing sexual
misconduct to the consistory [local church governing council] testifies that the pres-
sure of church discipline helped to inculcate a new moral sensibility") (emphasis ad-
ded); HILL, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM, supra note 6, at 186-87; Louis B. WRIGHT,
MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND 49 (1958) (noting that one of
the benefits of grammar schools was the inculcation of good morals).
245. BENEDICT, supra note 21, at 429-30. Benedict states:
Within the ... Church of England, practical divines championed a style of
personal piety that sought to foster a far more single-minded, systematic
pursuit of virtue . . . . [T]he great[est] accomplishment of the Reformed
churches was to have completed Luther's reformation of doctrine with a ref-
ormation of life .... [T]he Reformed cause . . . awakened high hopes of
both individual and collective moral transformation.
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spread moral laxity and ignorance required extensive outside control
(external discipline to make up for the lack of internal discipline) and
education to make self-control possible. 246 The incompatibility of ig-
norance with self-control explains the Puritan practice of catechizing
church members,247 as well as why admonition was the first (and in
many cases the only necessary24 8) level of institutional church disci-
pline. Even other believers who had no formal authority over the ac-
tions of their brethren were obliged to use moral suasion to affect the
needed self-discipline in their neighbors.249
2. A Mark of the True Church
The subject of ecclesiastical discipline in Puritan thought and prac-
tice encompasses both its centrality and its methodology. The impor-
tance of church discipline is evidenced by its status as one of the
indispensable signs or marks by which a true church could be differen-
tiated from a false pretender25 0 by at least some segments of the Re-
formed church.25 1 For those who asserted that discipline was a mark
246. See HILL, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM, supra note 6, at 211 ("The preachers
were in general agreement about ignorance of Christian duties among the masses, and
the consequent need for rigorous control and re-education.").
247. Walter Travers, The Book of Discipline 1587, reprinted in THE REFORMATION
OF THE CHURCH 178, 183-85 (1987) ("Of the Catechism[:] Let the Catechism be
taught in every church .... Of Schools[:] Let children be instructed in Schools, both
in other learning, and especially in the catechism, that they may repeat it by heart,
and understand it ...."). See generally RICHARD BAXTER, THE REFORMED PASTOR
172-256 (William Brown ed., The Banner of Truth Trust 1974) (1656) (expounding at
length on the need for, and methods useful to, pastoral catechizing of the entire
congregation).
248. BENEDICT, supra note 21, at 461 (explaining that initial discipline of admoni-
tion from a pastor or ruling elder, which was heeded, would in most cases end the
disciplinary process; in one case, only one-half of the issues dealt with by an elder in
home visits were sent along to the consistory).
249. See id. at 489 (describing believers as feeling "a measure of responsibility for
each other's behavior"); GORSKI, supra note 18, at 21. Stating further:
Only by remaining blameless and above all reproach could the church fulfill
its testimonial function. Consequently, each individual was not only made
responsible for his or her own conduct but was charged to keep a watchful
eye over other members of the congregation and to remonstrate with those
who strayed from the path of righteousness. In sum, the Reformed Church
made each individual responsible not only for their own conduct but for the
purity of the church as a whole. Each watched each, and all watched all.
GORSKI, supra note 18, at 21.
250. See, e.g., JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 4.1.9 (John
T. McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., The Westminster Press 1960) (1559) [herein-
after CALVIN, INSTITUTES] ("Hence the form of the Church appears and stands forth
conspicuous to our view."); FRANCIS TURRETIN, 3 INSTITUTES OF ELENCTIC THEOL-
oGY 86 (James T. Dennison, Jr. ed., George Musgrave Giger trans., P & R Publ'g
1997) (1685) ("[Ijt is of great value to know [the church's] true marks that we may be
able to distinguish the true fold of Christ from the dens of wolves .... ).
251. See, e.g., FIRST SCOTS CONFESSION OF FAITH (1560), reprinted in 3 PHILIP
SCHAFF, THE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM 461-62 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1877)
("The notes therefore of the trew Kirk of God we beleeve, confesse, and avow to be,
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of the church, its omission invalidated any church's claim to be a true
church.
Not every segment of the Reformed tradition considered discipline
to be a mark of the church.252 However, this difference is only of
nominal importance because even where it was not technically under-
stood as a mark essential to the existence of a church, it was, nonethe-
less, held to be indispensable to the health of a church.253 Discipline
was "necessary for all times, '254 and the Puritans earnestly sought af-
ter it. 5 Discipline was so important that communication between
first, the trew preaching of the Worde of God .... Secundly, the right administration
of the Sacraments .... Last, Ecclesiastical discipline uprightlie ministered, as Goddis
Worde prescribes, whereby vice is repressed, and vertew nurished.") (footnotes omit-
ted); THE BELGIC CONFESSION, supra note 173, at 419 ("The marks by which the true
Church is known are these: If the pure doctrine of the gospel is preached therein; if
she maintains the pure administration of the sacraments as instituted by Christ; if
church discipline is exercised in punishing of sin .... "); THE IRISH ARTICLES OF
RELIGION (1615), reprinted in 3 PHILIP SCHAFF, THE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM 538
(New York, Harper & Bros. 1877) ("But particular and visible Churches ... be many
in number: wherein the more or less sincerely, according to Christ's institution, the
Word of God is taught, the Sacraments are administered, and the authority of the
Keys is used .... ").
252. See, e.g., CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 250, at 4.1.9 ("Hence the form of the
Church appears and stands forth conspicuous to our view. Wherever we see the word
of God sincerely preached ... we see the sacraments administered according to the
institution of Christ, there we cannot have any doubt that the Church of God has
some existence. ... ); THE FRENCH CONFESSION OF FAITH (1559), reprinted in 3
PHILIP SCHAFF, THE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM 375-76 (New York, Harper & Bros.
1877) (listing only the Word of God and Sacraments as marks of the church); THE
THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, supra note 173, at 503 (listing
only the Word and Sacraments); THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra
note 133, at 658, 667-68. THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH does not actually
list the marks of the church, but comes close by referring to those things which make a
church more or less pure, listing only the doctrine of the gospel and the administra-
tion of ordinances, and discussing church discipline, although it is not described as a
mark of the church. THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at
658, 667-68.
253. See THE FRENCH CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 252, at 375 (stating, in the
chapter preceding the list of the marks of the church, the Church is "the company of
the faithful who agree to follow the Word, . . . who advance in it all their lives.") (em-
phasis added); see also THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at
658, 671-73 (explaining the importance of doctrine and ordinances for the purity of
the church also say that the doctrine is to be taught "and embraced" and listing the
reasons making discipline necessary-all of which are of the utmost importance to the
health of a church) (emphasis added).
254. Travers, supra note 247, at 178.
255. See BAXTER, supra note 247, at 164, 166 ("What hath been more talked of, and
prayed for, and contended about in England, for many years past, than discipline? ...
Discipline is not a needless thing to the Church."). Calvin also saw discipline as es-
sential for the life of the church because it was essential to establish order, without
which no church can long endure. See CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 250, at 4.12.1.
Further stating:
If no society, nay, no house even a moderate family, can be kept in right
state without discipline, much more necessary is it in the church, so disci-
pline is, as it were, its sinews . . . [lack of discipline contributes to] the com-
plete devastation of the Church .... Discipline, therefore, is a kind of curb
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congregations was encouraged to yield mutual help in discipline.256
The Puritan goal was not merely to establish churches but to make
them strong and vital; for this reason, Puritans were greatly concerned
with fostering discipline.
With the health of the church at stake, the Puritans were very con-
cerned about ensuring that proper methods of discipline were em-
ployed. This concern led to a reconsideration of church offices.257
Puritanism introduced the office of ruling elder to England. 58 Ruling
elders were men selected by and from the people, primarily to super-
vise the morals and administer ecclesiastical discipline. 259 These rul-
ing elders were to join with the local parish pastors in supervising the
flock. 26° Both were to engage in regular visits to the members of their
to restrain and tame those who war against the doctrine of Christ, or it is a
kind of stimulus by which the indifferent are aroused ....
Id.; see also id. at 4.12.4. Stating further:
[W]e begin better to perceive how the spiritual jurisdiction of the Church...
is at once the best help to sound doctrine, the best foundation of order, and
the best bond of unity .... Those, I say, who trust that churches can long
stand without this bond of discipline are mistaken, unless, indeed, we can
with impunity dispense with a help which the Lord foresaw would be neces-
sary . . .")
Id.; see also JOHN CALVIN, THE NECESSITY OF REFORMING THE CHURCH 118 (Protes-
tant Heritage Press 1995) (1543) ("If it is thought proper to compare the two [Protes-
tant and Roman discipline], we are confident that our disorder ... will be found at all
events somewhat more orderly than the kind of order in which they glory.").
256. Travers, supra note 247, at 179 ("Particular churches ought to yield mutual
help one to another, for which cause they are to communicate amongst themselves.
The end of this communicating together is, that all things in them may be so directed
both in regard of doctrine and also of discipline . . ").
257. BENEDICT, supra note 21, 431. Benedict states:
For church reformers of all stripes in early modem Europe, the transforma-
tion of lay religious life began with the reformation of the parish ministry,
the church's agents in every locality. For most of those within the Reformed
tradition, a critical element of any reformation of the ministry in turn in-
volved remodeling church offices ....
Id.
258. AYLMER, supra note 39, at 56 (noting that it was the Presbyterian wing of
Puritanism that wanted to introduce "a system of church government by presbyters
[ministers] and elders") (emphasis added).
259. Travers, supra note 247, at 179 ("Besides there are also elders, which watch
over the life and behaviour of every man .... ); see also ACTS & ORDS. INTERREG-
NUM, supra note 125, at 749-54 and 833-38 (containing Acts of August 19, 1645 and
March 14, 1646, "An Ordinance for Keeping of Scandalous persons from the Sacra-
ment of the Lord's Supper .... ).
260. BENEDICT, supra note 21, at 460 ("The consistory [local ruling body of pastors
and ruling elders] was the essential agency for effecting the communal moral regener-
ation that appeared so attractive to so many amid the initial excitement of the Refor-
mation."); see also Travers, supra note 247, at 179 ("[Common counsel of the
eldership was to direct the churches corporate affairs, and] [t]hen also such as pertain
to particular persons. First, to all the members of that church.., that the wicked may
be corrected with ecclesiastical censures ....").
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congregations and to investigate the ongoing life and conduct of every
member.26'
The Puritans focused on implementing appropriate church officers
to administer discipline. The Puritans argued that the government of
the church was distinct from the state in the exercise of discipline, thus
allowing the consistories to function separately (though not autono-
mously) from the civil rulers.262 This gave rise to the significant provi-
sion of the Westminster Confession that "The Lord Jesus, as king and
head of his Church, hath therein appointed a government in the hand
of church officers, distinct from the civil magistrate. ' ' 263 In addition,
the Puritans maintained that all clergy were equal and thus that all
ministers together with the ruling elders should engage in ecclesiasti-
cal discipline. 264 These three reforms (strengthening the office of rul-
ing elder, establishing church government as distinct from the state,
and empowering all clergy to engage in discipline) created a powerful
mechanism at the local level to enforce church discipline on entire
congregations with the help of leaders drawn from the local
congregations.
3. Implications for Society, the Law, and the State
To the Puritan mind, "the axle of discipline" was not only necessary
for the individual and the church, but was also the basis for "[t]he
flourishing and decaying of all civil societies. ' 265 Whether it was an
individual, a family, a church, or a society, discipline was necessary in
261. See BAXTER, supra note 247, at 164 (lamenting how few ministers in England
actually know the people within their charge); Travers, supra note 247, at 186 ("Of
Elders[:] Let the elders know every particular house and person of the church, that
they may inform the minister of the condition of every one .... "); see also ACTS &
ORDS. INTERREGNUM, supra note 125, at 789-97 (containing the Act of August 19,
1645, "Ordinance regulating the Election of Elders").
262. It was this issue which caused the Divines at the Westminster Assembly to
"respectfully" send a letter to Parliament requesting it to change a declaration that
officers empowered by Parliament would participate in cases of church discipline re-
garding indictable offenses. The Divines even went so far as to indicate in their peti-
tion that they would not submit to the objectionable declaration! See MITCHELL,
supra note 124, at 297-300. In any event, Parliament made it clear that ecclesiastical
jurisdiction did not extend to cases of breach of contract. See also AcTs & ORDS.
INTERREGNUM, supra note 125, at 1207 (containing the Act of August 29, 1648, enti-
tled "An Ordinance for The Form of Church Government to be used in the Church of
England and Ireland .... "). Further Stating: "The Presbytery or Eldership shall not
have cognizance of any thing wherein any matter of Payment, Contract or Demand is
concerned, or of any matter of Conveyance, Title, Interest, or Property in Lands or
Goods." Id.
263. THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at 667.
264. The Form of Presbyterial Church-Government, reprinted in THE REFORMA-
TION OF THE CHURCH 209-14 (1987) (noting the power of a minister to rule over the
flock, and specifying that those commonly called "elders" are to join with the minister
in the government of the church).
265. HILL, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM, supra note 6, at 188 (quoting John Milton);
see also GORSKI, supra note 18, at 31 (quoting John Milton).
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order to promote order; where order was desired, discipline could not
be far behind.266 Reformational Calvinists also wanted a disciplined
society as well as disciplined individuals and churches.267 As a result,
society was increasingly disciplined, and the state's hand in that pro-
cess was greatly strengthened.268 The connection between religious
discipline and the state and larger society was a product of the inter-
connection of the two, of the increased social religiously driven disci-
pline, and of the eventual state takeover of much of the infrastructure
for social control.
The relationship between Puritan religious discipline and its effects
on society and the state must be seen against the backdrop of the close
interrelationship that existed between church and state.269 In many
social matters, the "cooperation between the religious and civil au-
thorities was generally tight., 27° The ethos of the day was one where
the entire social life was to be Christianized; godliness was to be im-
posed on the world to create a Christian polity. 271 The original ver-
sion of the Westminster Confession provided for an established
church.272 Therefore, the goal was to have authority rest in (presuma-
bly) self-disciplined, godly magistrates. 73 There was no area of social
266. CALVIN, INSTITUTES, supra note 250, at 4.12.1 (explaining the need for disci-
pline in the church by establishing that the church as a society is no different than any
other society and that the need for discipline in the church was common to the family
and the state); HILL, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM, supra note 6, at 189 (indicating that
Milton's support for "presbyterian discipline in 1641-42 arose from his sense of the
need for tight organization and solidarity among those who wished to remove
disorder").
267. GORSKI, supra note 18, at 27 ("The Calvinists ...were not content with a
disciplined church; they wanted a disciplined society, as well.").
268. See id. at 38 (noting the increase in state discipline potential arising from the
Reformation).
269. See supra text accompanying note 262.
270. GORSKI, supra note 18, at 19.
271. See GORSKI, supra note 18, at 27-28 ("[Radical Calvinists, including those of
the English Revolution] aspired to the political 'domination of the religious virtuosos
belonging to the church' and to the 'imposition of godly law upon the world.'") (foot-
note omitted); HILL, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM, supra note 6, at 186 ("The puritan
movement ... is always groping towards a form of organization which will fulfil (sic]
the functions of a political party, to remake society as God wished to see it.").
272. See THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at 653. Stating
further:
The civil magistrate ... hath authority, and it is his duty to take order, that
unity and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept
pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corrup-
tions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the
ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
273. See GORSKI, supra note 18, at 21 (reflecting on Calvin's view of the duties of
the godly magistrate); HILL, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM, supra note 6, at 203 ("Calvin-
ist fallen man can only be reduced to civil subordination (failing regeneration) by an
imposed discipline."). Further stating:
Natural man cannot be left to himself .... he must be subordinated to a new
discipline and leadership, to the control of the regenerate .... Only the en-
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life that could not be influenced by both church and state. The key
difference was that the religious impetus for this discipline affected
society in a bottom-up manner,274 which may explain its greater im-
pact on society.275
The Puritan process of strengthening the church through the rigor-
ous use of discipline had the indirect effect of enhancing state power
because it created new means to enforce discipline. 276 The network of
practices, institutions, and mechanisms created and utilized for relig-
ious governance significantly increased the possibilities for social con-
trol.277 These networks created the infrastructure that made possible
the exercise of wider and deeper political power and dominion.278
Even without such an infrastructure of networks of control, states had
previously attempted such discipline; however, they had lacked the
capacity to implement it.279 Puritan churches, through the work of
local pastors and ruling elders, were able to bring about a level of
social control which many monarchs longed for but which had been
beyond their grasp. States have had the head but not always the arms
and legs necessary to successfully, or even sufficiently, direct their
people.28°
lightened elect are capable of fighting against the sins and corruption of the
mass of humanity. Hence it is the divine will that they should be in a posi-
tion of power over the unregenerate many .... Yet God remained a Task-
master, even for those who would not discipline themselves. An external
discipline was needed to help [the undisciplined] ....
HILL, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM, supra note 6, at 204-05; accord LITTLE, supra note
72, at 67.
274. GORSKI, supra note 18, at 2, 19 (suggesting a bottom-up reading of early state
formation as opposed to a top-down and highlighting the bottom-up nature of disci-
pline observed in the confessionalization paradigm).
275. See id. at 33 (observing that bottom-up discipline tends to have greater impact
on a society).
276. Id. at 18 ("Church-building also enhanced state power indirectly by establish-
ing new mechanisms of moral regulation and social control.").
277. Id. at xv ("By refining and diffusing a panoply of disciplinary techniques and
strategies, it is argued, Calvin and his followers helped create an infrastructure of
religious governance and social control that served as a model for the rest of Eu-
rope-and the world.").
278. Id. at xvi (comparing the disciplinary revolution to the industrial revolution-
both transformed the means of production and indicating that the power of surveil-
lance made political power and domination truly possible).
279. Id. at 18. Stating further:
Of course, there was nothing new about attempts to impose social discipline
on the populace; urban magistrates and territorial rulers had been attempt-
ing to alter the behavior of their subjects ... through a plethora of legislation
.... But they generally lacked the administrative capacities to enforce these
rules. It was here that the church proved [most] crucial.
Id. (footnote omitted).
280. Id. at 22 ("[A] great deal of attention has been devoted [in state theory] to the
nerve centers of the state-the fiscal and administrative apparatus-very little has
been paid to its torso and limbs-the networks of practices and institutions that it uses
to embrace and guide the population.") (footnote omitted).
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At least three specific areas of society were targeted for reform:
education, poor relief, and general morals. Education's disciplinary
value was as real to society at large as it was to the church. Popular
education that was accessible to the poor could produce both religious
and social benefits such as literacy,?81 as well as inculcating good
morals.282 Poor relief became an early form of both welfare and
workfare with a distinction drawn between the able bodied and the
truly needy.28 3 Those who were able were directed to work.284 Gen-
eral morals, especially marriage and sex but also issues such as drunk-
enness and gambling, came to the attention of the church. Marriages
were recorded,285 and reconciliation was sought in cases of marital dis-
cord.286 Illicit sexual relations such as adultery, concubinage, and pre-
marital sex were all subject to church discipline. 287 Drinking and
gambling were also vices which consistories tried to stamp out.288 In
all of these ways, discipline overflowed beyond the church to the pop-
ulation as a whole.289
Significantly, while the infrastructure was laid down by the church
in order to facilitate its disciplining of society, it paved the way for the
state to utilize the same highways in order to establish its own control.
How did such a change take place? First, state involvement in religion
increased the reach of the law and helped breed disciplined subjects
with the state as the disciplining body.290 The state was enabled to go
where only the church might have gone before. Second, and more
281. BENEDICT, supra note 21, at 543 (noting that Calvinism contributed signifi-
cantly to the spread of literacy due to its desire to see life lived in strict accordance
with God's word).
282. WRIGHT, supra note 244, at 49 ("[T]he general feeling that the grammar
schools inculcated good morals exercised a powerful influence in their favor.").
283. GORSKI, supra note 18, at 18-19 (stating that desanctifying poverty allowed
discrimination between the deserving poor and the able-bodied poor, "providing aid
to the former and setting the latter to work"). Stating further:
[O]ne of the mechanisms through which [Calvinists] sought to achieve this
new society was poor-relief. It was the Calvinists ... who first did away with
''received forms of charity" and replaced them with a rational system of
poor-relief.., and it was they, too, who first used the poor law as an instru-
ment of labor discipline.
Id. at 27 (footnote omitted).
284. Id. at 19.
285. Id.
286. BENEDICT, supra note 21, at 541 (noting that disciplinary boards dedicated
their time to "reconciling quarreling spouses and neighbors").
287. Id. at 477 (observing that such vices preoccupied many disciplinary bodies).
288. Id.
289. GORSKI, supra note 18, at 22 ("The new schools and workhouses, not surpris-
ingly, employed the same mechanisms of moral surveillance and social control as the
Calvinist consistories. Indeed, they may be seen as an attempt to extend the disci-
pline of the Reformed Church to the population as a whole.") (footnote omitted).
290. BENEDICT, supra note 21, at 430 ("The splintering of Western Christendom
into rival creeds caused territorial rulers to feel compelled to take the care of religion
under their wing .... In doing so, they increased the reach of their law-making power
and bred dutiful, disciplined subjects.").
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importantly, there was a gradual takeover whereby civil government
supplanted the ecclesiastical at the reigns of discipline.29' In the long
run, the original symbiotic relationship proved more beneficial to the
state than to the church.292 The camel of the state first entered the
tent of the church in order to protect it, and later it displaced its origi-
nal occupants. Therefore, Puritan Calvinistic religious discipline had
dramatic social implications that both indirectly and directly enhanced
the state's social control capabilities.
IV. INDEBITATUS ASSUMPSIT, CONSIDERATION, AND CONDITIONS
A. History of Analysis
Roscoe Pound was the first American legal scholar to devote any
attention to the relationship of Puritanism to the common law of con-
tracts.293 Pound asserted that the liberty of contract was simply a de-
duction from Puritanism's teaching that human beings were free
moral agents.294 However, the Puritans did not teach that people
were free moral agents in Pound's libertarian sense of the term.295
The Puritan understanding of liberty was the freedom to obey God's
law, not freedom of the unconstrained will.2 96 Neither did the Puri-
tans believe in an unfettered liberty of contract.297 Puritans were con-
sistently champions of usury laws and continued to oppose enclosing
common lands even after the issue had become politically pass6.298
In the last fifty years, two eminent legal historians have taken up
the challenge to understand Puritanism on its own terms and to iden-
tify connections between Puritan doctrines and the common law of
291. GORSKI, supra note 18, at 19 ("[The sources and dimensions of state-formation
were] the bottom-up creation of new strategies and mechanisms of discipline and gov-
ernance and their gradual instrumentalization and absorption by political elites.").
292. Id. ("In the long run, however, this symbiosis proved more beneficial for one
party than the other; ultimately, the state monopolized control over the new infra-
structures of power . . ").
293. See Pound, supra note 144, at 820 ("[I]t [alleged Puritan individualism] has
given us the conception of liberty of contract, which is the bane of all labor legislation,
the rooted objection to all power of equitable application of rules to concrete cases
294. Id. at 819:
A fundamental proposition from which the Puritan proceeded was the doc-
trine that man was a free moral agent with power to choose what he would
do and a responsibility coincident with that power .... [E]very one [sic]
must assume and abide the consequences of the choice he was free to make
.... [L]iberty of contract was a further necessary deduction.
Id.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 210-33 for discussion of predestination and
covenant.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 243-45 for discussion of the Puritan under-
standing of discipline.
297. See supra note 145 and text accompanying notes 158-68 for a list of Puritan
restrictions on freedom of contract.
298. See THE LARGER CATECHISM, supra note 86, at 63-64.
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contracts. After preparing his dissertation and then his book, Puri-
tans, Lawyers, and Politics,2 9 9 John Eusden could only conclude that
"evidence of Puritan influence on common law and vice versa did not
materialize."3 ° At most Eusden opined that "the relationship of Pu-
ritanism and common law was one of ideological parallelism."30 1 In
contrast, in Law and Revolution 11,302 Harold Berman argues that the
Puritan aspect of the English Reformation was the historical cause for
the momentous changes in English public and private law noted
above.30 3 With respect to private law, Berman goes so far as to assert
that it was the "collectivist Calvinist doctrines of covenant and cove-
nanted communities" which lay at the root of capitalism in
England.3 °4
Berman forms his argument for a connection between Puritanism
and the common law of contracts in two areas: procedural and sub-
stantive. First, "the action of special assumpsit was transformed into
an action for breach of contract .... "305 By cultivating the growth of
indebitatus assumpsit, the common law courts created a tool to ad-
dress a range of voluntary agreements instead of what had previously
been scattered among a number of writs.30 6 The common law made
this change because "the underlying theory of liability shifted from
breach of promise to breach of a bargain," in other words, from moral
wrong to unrequited expectation.30 7 Second was the rationalization of
the common law rules of contract by which the courts constructed a
coherent law of contracts (rather than a variety of writ-based reme-
dies). This rationalization, in turn, occurred in two particular substan-
tive legal doctrines. 30 8 The common law courts not only expanded the
299. EUSDEN, supra note 17.
300. Id. at viii.
301. Id.
302. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II, supra note 17, at 340-41.
303. See id. at 340-41.
304. Id. at 27. Berman further states: "Much more important than the doctrine of
predestination, or, indeed, of the famous Protestant work ethic, was the Calvinist the-
ology of covenant." Id. at 348.
305. Harold J. Berman, Law and Belief in Three Revolutions, 18 VAL. U. L. REV.
569, 601 (1984) [hereinafter Berman, Law and Belie].
306. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II, supra note 17, at 337-38 ("The early
English common law ... had only limited remedies for contractual disputes, resolving
them chiefly through the common law actions of debt, detinue, account, deceit, cove-
nant, and trespass on the case .... Trespass on the case came closest to a contract
action when it became applicable in 'assumpsit ....').
307. Id. at 339. Although Berman does not specify a precise time at which this
change occurred, he notes in the preceding paragraph that it was "[e]specially after
1660... [that] the common law courts gradually adopted a great many of the reme-
dies and rules that had been elaborated in the previous hundred years by the preroga-
tive courts and by Chancery." Id.
308.
Efforts to rationalize the English common law, as well as to secure property
and contract rights, were connected with the Puritan emphasis on order and
discipline .... Developments in the law of contract ... were also connected
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reach of old writs but also changed the doctrine of consideration to
bring more agreements within their scope: "The older conception that
the 'consideration' underlying the contract is its purpose or motive or
justification ... gave way in the latter seventeenth century to a con-
ception of consideration as the price paid by the promisee for the
promise of the promisor."309 The courts in the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury also "established that a bargained exchange was binding and ac-
tionable on breach, regardless of the absence of fault. ' 310  Strict
liability in contract was, according to Berman, the creation of
Paradine v. Jane.3"'
Yet, Eusden saw none of this. How can two such serious historians
come to such different conclusions? And, more importantly, is either
correct? This paper will analyze the growth of indebitatus assumpsit,
the modification of consideration, and independence of promissory
conditions to see if evidence of Puritan doctrine can be found. The
discussion will be brief because each of these topics already has been
mined extensively. Even if no theological connection can be detected,
the question of the relationship of Puritan social practice to changes in
the common law of contracts must be considered.
B. Indebitatus Assumpsit
The origins of the tort-like writ of trespass extend to the late twelfth
century, nearly to the beginnings of the common law itself.31 z Origi-
nally, assumpsit (roughly, "he has undertaken"),3 13 a specific use of
trespass, dealt with actions of deceit.314 Even though a typical case of
deceit or fraud hardly seems to meet trespass's requirement of vi et
armis et contra pacem regis (with force and arms and against the king's
peace), over the next two centuries, the royal courts were, nonethe-
less, anxious to extend their jurisdiction at the expense of the local
courts. 15 In 1442, there was a "jump in judicial reasoning" when
royal courts permitted an action for nonperformance of a contract to
with the Calvinist emphasis on voluntary action, the act of will, in the service
of God, together with God's faithfulness in response.
Berman, Law and Belief, supra note 305, at 607.
309. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, 11, supra note 17, at 339-40.
310. See Berman, Law and Belief, supra note 305, at 603.
311. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II, supra note 17, at 340 ("In Paradine v.
Jane [sic], the court enunciated a broad principle of strict contractual liability.").
312. TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 13 ("The beginning of the writ of trespass is in the
latter part of the twelfth century, but its genesis is hazy .... ); see PLUCKNETr, supra
note 16, at 366-67 (discussing early use of trespass to vindicate contract claims).
313. See SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT, supra note 16, at 215-18 (lengthy
discussion of semantic domain of "assumpsit").
314. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 16, at 637.
315. See TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 15, 31 (analyzing reasons for growth of royal
courts' claims to actions that did not breach the king's peace); see also SIMPSON, A
HISTORY OF CONTRACT, supra note 16, at 203 (discussing growing opposition in royal
courts to sham allegations of violence and substitution in its place of special pleading
of the defendant's wrong).
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proceed as an assumpsit when the defendant had disabled himself
from performing. 16 Now, the plaintiff need allege only that the de-
fendant's act was against the king's peace; no longer did the courts
require an allegation of violence.317 Slightly more than half a century
later, Common Pleas in Orwell v. Mortoft extended assumpsit another
step to include nonperformance even without disablement.318 Yet, the
court still required something more than an informal promise to per-
mit an assumpsit: the plaintiff must have previously paid money to the
defendant.319
The next step in the expansion of the common law's capacity to
handle contract claims brings one to the eve of the English Reforma-
tion. The King's Bench had lost a great deal of their caseload in the
first third of the sixteenth century and was anxious to expand its juris-
diction by "extend[ing] the notion of trespass to include breaches of
contract and even failures to pay debts. '32 ° This extension of jurisdic-
tion was troublesome because the common law courts had long held
that no two writs would lie for the same facts.32 ' Yet assumpsit for
breach of promise, at least where the plaintiff had prepaid for the de-
fendant's prospective performance, seemed identical to the old writ of
debt.322 A writ for debt would properly lie where the defendant had
received something-a quid pro quo-from the plaintiff.323  The
judges of the King's Bench discerned two differences between an ac-
tion to recover payment for an unperformed obligation lying in debt
(over which they had no jurisdiction) 324 and an action in assumpsit
arising out of the same obligation. First was the existence of the
promise, the undertaking, itself. Unlike debt, assumpsit required the
316. See TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 32-33 (describing the facts, reasoning, and con-
clusion in Doige's Case).
317. See SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT, supra note 16, at 203.
318. Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 20 Hen. VII, f. 8, pl. 18 (1505), reprinted in FIFOOT,
supra note 77, at 351-53.
319. TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 34 ("This requirement of the payment of money was
the formality [Chief Justice of the Common Pleas] Frowyk required in place of the
sealed deed [of a covenant]."); see also Nota, Y.B. Mich. 21 Hen. VII, f. 41, pl. 66
(1506), reprinted in FIFOOT, supra note 77, at 353 (noting requirement of prepayment
by the plaintiff).
320. J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 32 (1971) (dis-
cussing the decline of the King's Bench and judicial response).
321. See TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 38 ("Assumpsit could not be brought if there
was an older formed writ in the Register covering a given transaction.").
322. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 16, at 633 ("The oldest and most important [form
of action for contracts] was the action of debt .....
323. Id. at 634.
324. See id. at 644 ("Assumpsit, being a form of trespass, could be brought either in
the King's Bench or Common Pleas: debt, on the other hand, could only be brought in
the Common Pleas."); see also TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 34 (noting that Common
Pleas resisted the expansion of assumpsit by the King's Bench because debt "was their
jurisdiction exclusively").
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added element of deceit, evidenced by a broken promise.32 5 Whether
the defendant actually made such a promise was of little importance;
the writ would be granted if the plaintiff alleged it, and the King's
Bench would leave it to the nisi prius judge and jury at the assizes to
sort out the truth.326 Second was the expanded range of damages
available in assumpsit. The plaintiff in debt could obtain only what
had been paid to the defendant3 27 or the amount to which the parties
had agreed in a bond.32 8 In assumpsit, however, the plaintiff could, in
addition, recover consequential damages.32 9 The King's Bench had
made clear a plaintiff's ability to recoup consequential damages in as-
sumpsit by no later than 1532.330 By applying assumpsit, which had
begun as a remedy for personal wrongs, to breach of contract, an in-
jury that had long been perceived as an injury to property, the King's
Bench created the opportunity for a broader vindication of the expec-
tation interest. By releasing the expectation interest from the confines
of the quid pro quo or the penal bond, assumpsit, at least theoreti-
cally, put the expectation interest into play in a way that debt had not;
perhaps the injured party could obtain consequential damages. The
risk of excessive consequential damages later addressed in Hadley v.
Baxendale331 was opened. Three hundred years later the common law
325. See David Ibbetson, Assumpsit and Debt in the Early Sixteenth Century: The
Origins of the Indebitatus Count, 41 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 142, 148 (1982) [hereinafter Ib-
betson, Assumpsit and Debt] ("It could be argued that assumpsit was founded on the
defendant's breach of promise... ; the former [assumpsit] looked to the defendant's
wrong, while the latter [debt] looked to the plaintiff's right."); see also FIFOOT, supra
note 77, at 338-39 (discussing evolution of assumpsit); A. W. B. Simpson, The Place of
Slade's Case in the History of Contract, 74 L.Q. REV. 381 (1958) [hereinafter Simpson,
The Place of Slade's Case] ("The pleading device employed in 1505 to distinguish the
cause of action in case from that in debt was that of describing the act of which the
plaintiff complained as a conversion ... and to allege that the defendant had under-
taken (super se assumpsit) to deliver .... ").
326. See Francis, supra note 17, at 57 ("When the parties had joined issue on a
question of fact through the natural course of the pleading, the date would be set for
trial and the matter would then be decided by the jury at nisi prius .... ); see also
PLUCKNE--, supra note 16, at 644-45 ("The King's Bench could therefore not resist
the temptation to use indebitatus assumpsit as an equivalent to debt. This was easily
done by holding that where a debt existed, a subsequent assumpsit would be pre-
sumed in law, and need not be proved as a fact."); TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 38
("After it was established that the separate promise in the new indebitatus assumpsit
form avoided the objection of overlap with Debt, the King's Bench eroded the sanc-
tity of the Register further by not requiring the subsequent promise to be proved.").
327. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 16, at 643:
328. See Francis, supra note 17, at 91.
329. See Ibbetson, Assumpsit and Debt, supra note 325, at 148 (discussing relation-
ship of consequential damages to claims in assumpsit).
330. See TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 37 ("[T]he plaintiff successfully distinguished [in
Pickering v. Thurgoode] the damages suffered by emphasizing that the loss suffered
by the breach of the undertaking was not just for the value of the [undelivered] malt
but for the damages of paying a higher price elsewhere.").
331. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
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courts were forced to decide how the door they had opened in the
early sixteenth century should be closed.
The final step by which the common law came to provide a general
contracts remedy is found in the recognition of indebitatus assumpsit
as a standardized writ. According to Theodore Plucknett, the first ex-
ample of the use of a writ with this phrase occurred in 1542.332 Kevin
Teeven pushes the first use back to 1530 but agrees that it became a
standardized form in the King's Bench by the 1540s.333 Indebitatus
assumpsit roughly translates into "having become indebted he has un-
dertaken [to pay]." The significance of indebitatus assumpsit lies in
the courts' routine recognitions of the writ, which enhanced its utility
and thus the frequency of its use.3 34 The convenience of indebitatus
assumpsit, at least in the King's Bench, culminated in 1573 in Edwards
v. Burre335 when that court held that an assumpsit would be presumed
in every case where the plaintiff proved debt.336 The needs of the
growing commercial economy were vindicated.337
The rise of assumpsit as a tool of informal contract enforcement
pre-dated Puritanism.338 Berman's assertion that "the underlying
presuppositions of contractual liability . . . remained basically the
332. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 16, at 644 ("[W]e find a new variety of assumpsit
appearing in the middle of the sixteenth century called indebitatus assumpsit.... The
earliest example seems to be in 1542 ....").
333. See TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 38 (discussing origins and spread of use of count
of indebitatus assumpsit); see also Ibbetson, Assumpsit and Debt, supra note 325, at
142 (noting great increase in use of indebitatus assumpsit in the 1540s); Simpson, The
Place of Slade's Case, supra note 325, at 385 (noting that Common Pleas did not rec-
ognize indebitatus assumpsit until 1573).
334. See TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 35-36 (analyzing growth in frequency of use of
assumpsit over course of sixteenth century); see also FIFOOT, supra note 77, at 368
(discussing the simplicity of pleading indebitatus assumpsit as a factor in its increasing
use); Francis, supra note 17, at 58 (noting that assumpsit had replaced debt as the
primary contract tool by the early seventeenth century).
335. Edwards v. Burre, 123 Eng. Rep. 310 (K.B. 1573).
336. See SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT, supra note 16, at 492.
The court of King's Bench, being sympathetic to the use of assumpsit,
adopted the doctrine that, where there was a debt contract and the debt was
still owing, the law would imply a promise to pay the debt. Every contract
executory imports or implies an assumpsit .... In Edwards v. Burre (1573)
this is very clearly put by Wray[,] C.J.
Id.; see also Stone v. Withepoole, 74 Eng. Rep. 924 (K.B. 1588) (quoting Coke for the
defendant executor who successfully pleaded nihil debet on the ground that the testa-
tor had been a minor when he contracted the underlying debt: "The consideration is
the ground of every action on the case, and it ought [to] be either a charge to the
plaintiff or a benefit to the defendant."); Pulmants Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 686 (K.B.
1584).
337. The decision in Slade's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B. 1602), simply confirmed
the legitimacy of what the King's Bench had been doing with assumpsit for the past
twenty years. See generally Simpson, The Place of Slade's Case, supra note 325, at
392.
338. To be sure, the influence of Calvinism on English Protestantism reaches back
further than 1560. See supra text accompanying note 122. Although the influence of
the Calvinistic tradition of the Reformation can be traced to the late 1540s, there is no
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same, in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, as they had
been in the earlier period" '339 cannot be substantiated. Well before
the turn of the seventeenth century, the common law courts had made
the turn from delict to contract.340 Puritanism cannot account for the
lengthy development of assumpsit as a tool to protect the expectation
interest. Rather, the common law's writ system and traditional adher-
ence to the forms of action in the Registry delayed the change from
reliance to expectation. The rapidly developing market-based econ-
omy provided the impetus for the change. While Henry's dissolution
of the monasteries and the disciplinary revolution of the Protestant
Reformation contributed to the expansion of a commercial society,
Puritanism was neither an antecedent nor a concurrent factor in the
rise of indebitatus assumpsit.
C. Consideration
For hundreds of years prior to the rise of indebitatus assumpsit, law-
yers had used the term consideration "in the merely the general sense
of reason or motive."3 41 Similar to the civilian notion of causa, consid-
eration, thus understood, could have opened the door to enforcement
of a wide variety of promises when coupled with the expansion of as-
sumpsit. In fact, widespread promissory enforcement lay at the heart
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction espoused by the Doctor of Divinity in
Christopher St. German's Doctor and Student.342 St. German's stu-
dent of the common law, however, was quick to point out that the
common law had never recognized such a wide-ranging liability of
breach of promise.343 Instead, by St. German's day, the common law
recognized promissory liability in cases of debt, covenant, and, only
evidence that Calvinism in general or Puritanism in particular had any influence on
common lawyers before the seventeenth century.
339. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II, supra note 17, at 338.
340. See FIFOOT, supra note 77, at 339 ("By the middle of the sixteenth century the
modern conception of contract had in essence been formulated.").
341. Id. at 396.
342. CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, Dial. II, c. 24 (1530), re-
printed in 91 Selden Society 230, 300-14 (T. F. T. Plucknett & J. L. Barton eds., 1974).
343. Id. at 228-32. Stating further:
Student) Fyrst it is to be vnderstande that ... in the lawes of Englande what
dyuersyty is bytwene a contracte/ a promyse/ a gyfte/ a lone/ a bargeyne/ a
couenant/ or suche other/for the intente of the lawe ys to haue the effecte of
the mater argued and not the termes/ and a nude contracte is where a man
maketh a bargayne or a sale of his goodes or landes without any recompence
appointed for yt. As yf I saye to a nother I sell the all my lande or all my
goodes & nothynge is assigned that the other shall gyue or paye for yt/ that
ys a nude contracte/ and as I take yt: it ys voyde in the lawe and conscience
• . . and I thynke no accyon lyeth in those cases thoughe they be not
perfourmed.
Yf he to whome the promyse ys made: haue a charge by reason of the pro-
myse ... than in that case he shall haue an accyon for that thing that was
promised .... As yf a man saye to an other (heele suche a poore man of hys
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recently, assumpsit. 344 Consideration in debt and covenant were
straightforward. There was liability in debt if the plaintiff alleged and
proved either that the defendant had given a bond and then failed to
satisfy one of its conditions or that pursuant to agreement, the plain-
tiff had prepaid the price or delivered goods (the quid pro quo) to the
defendant who had failed to perform the remaining obligation.345 If a
written undertaking under seal existed, then the writ of covenant
would lie.346
The common law courts faced a difficult question with the acceler-
ated use of assumpsit for enforcement of informal contracts: What
could be the consideration for the promise which, standing alone, was
an unenforceable nudum pactum? If the courts admitted the underly-
ing bargain was the consideration, then how could they avoid the risk
of duplication with the writ of debt? The first step of the solution was
to recognize an independent reliance interest that enforcement of the
assumpsit would protect; reliance on the defendant's promise caused
dyssease/ or make suche an hyghewaye/ and I shall gyue the thus moche/ and
yf he do yt I thynke an accyon lyeth at the comon lawe.
Doctour) But what hold they yf the promyse be made for a thing past/ as I
promyse the .xl. pounde for that thou hast buylded me such a house/ lyeth an
accyon there.
Student) They say nay ....
Doctour) And yf a man promyse to gyue a nother .xl. li. in recompense for
suche a trespass that he hath done hym/ lyeth an accyon there.
Student) I suppose naye/ and the cause ys that suche promises be noo
perfyte contractes/ for a contracte is properly where a man for his money
shall haue by assente of the other partye certayne goods or some other
profyte at the tyme of the contracte or after/ but if the thynge be promised
for a cause that ys past ... then yt ys rather an accorde ....
Id.
344. Chancery and the ecclesiastical courts had already enforced many promises
that did not fit one of the common law writs:
A century before Assumpsit became contractual, Chancery had given relief
by the enforcement of informal promises to individuals .... The clerical
Chancellors generally followed canon law principles and procedures and ap-
plied the civilian notion that if there was a causa.., then it ought to be
enforced ....
Statistics also show an increase in royal court Assumpsit work because of a
transfer of ecclesiastical fidei laesio business from the church courts to the
common law courts during the anti-clerical first half of the sixteenth century
.... Fidei laesio was a church court action for the enforcement of a sworn
promise.
TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 34, 36.
345. See FIFooT, supra note 77, at 229 ("Debt lay only where the plaintiff could
depend upon a formality or could prove a substantial benefit conferred normally
upon the defendant himself .... ").
346. Id. at 257 (discussing the rule settled by the thirteenth century that covenant
would lie only if there was a writing under seal).
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damages to the plaintiff.347 Yet, this solution only pushed back the
question and added an additional step: What damages could the plain-
tiff suffer by virtue of reliance on the promise to pay that were not
identical with the underlying debt? Consequential damages presented
one distinction34 8 while unique interests such as continued possession
of land presented another349 and forbearance on account of the prom-
ise a third difference from debt.35 °
During the earliest stages of the expansion of the reach of assump-
sit, courts found consideration even for promises for which there were
no consequential damages, unique interest, or concurrent bargain
such as forbearance. Thus, one finds the King's Bench permitting as-
sumpsit to lie in cases where the only consideration was past (i.e., the
debt) 351 and at least in some cases where the consideration was love
and affection,352 both of which would have fit under civil law causa.3 5 3
As the sixteenth century progressed, consideration in assumpsit
quickly came to be applied in most situations only where there had
been a bargain 4.3 5  And even where the courts found consideration
347. See TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 39 ("One important source of consideration was
in the context of liability based on a reliance remedy-the plaintiff could recover if he
relied on the defendant's promise to his loss.").
348. See supra text accompanying notes 329-331.
349. See, e.g., Lady Shandois v. Simson, 78 Eng. Rep. 1104 (K.B. 1602) (explaining
that a request by the defendant to embroider a gown belonging to a third party is a
sufficient consideration for her promise to the plaintiff to pay for it); Sherwood v.
Woodward, 78 Eng. Rep. 935 (K.B. 1599) (allowing assumpsit to enforce defendant's
liability as surety); Mountford v. Catesby, 73 Eng. Rep. 741 (K.B. 1573) (stating as-
sumpsit allowed to enforce a landlord's promise of quiet enjoyment).
350. See, e.g., Whorwood v. Gybbons, 75 Eng. Rep. 986 (K.B. 1587) (finding consid-
eration for a promise to pay after a short delay following the rendering of an ac-
count); see also Stone v. Withepoole, 74 Eng. Rep. 924 (K.B. 1588); Gill v. Harewood,
74 Eng. Rep. 57 (K.B. 1587).
351. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Pinhowe, 78 Eng. Rep. 669 (K.B. 1595) (stating "pre-
existing duty rule" not observed where the plaintiff's voluntary payment of £ 4 (of a £
5 debt) without further suit by defendant was held to be a sufficient benefit to consti-
tute consideration for defendant's promise of satisfaction).
352. See, e.g., Sharington v. Strotton, 75 Eng. Rep. 454 (K.B. 1565) (stating that
love and affection are sufficient consideration for a deed). But see Hunt v. Bate, 73
Eng. Rep. 605 (K.B. 1568) (noting that no consideration existed even for promise to
repay a friend for mainprizing defendant's employee).
353. In civilian terms causa was the reason or motive for the promise, without
which the promise was unenforceable. Common law Assumpsit declarations
sometimes included the term causa by 1540, though the meaning of causa in
the common law may have included aspects of both motive and recompense.
Furthermore, the causa in some of the early decisions may have been the
plaintiff's reliance .... [Another] important influence from Chancery re-
lated to causa was the requirement of equitable consideration to raise a use
TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 40; see also Salmond, supra note 16, at 173-76 (discussing at
length how equity first used consideration in its contract cases in the sense of causa-
including valuable consideration, natural affection, legal obligation, and moral obliga-
tion-and how the common law retained this concept as assumpsit expanded).
354. See, e.g., Hodge v. Vavisour, 81 Eng. Rep. 188 (K.B. 1616) (finding a tacit
consideration implied for a subsequent promise to pay a pre-existing obligation for
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outside of today's understanding of a bargain, they noted the exis-
tence of a continuing benefit to the defendant or a third party whom
the plaintiff benefited at the defendant's request. 355 The pressure for
expansion of assumpsit came from material causes and legal theory
only followed; thus, by the turn of the seventeenth century, contract
law, as currently understood, was expressed in the courts' understand-
ing of assumpsit 6 Yet it should not be assumed that moral consider-
ations were irrelevant to the search for consideration. As Teeven
notes, "there were moral underpinnings for the doctrine of considera-
tion based on the ancient truths that bargains should bind both parties
the purchase of goods); Nichols v. Raynbred, 80 Eng. Rep. 238 (K.B. 1612) (finding
that a "promise for promise" was consideration for each); Docket v. Voyel, 78 Eng.
Rep. 1110 (K.B. 1602) (finding no consideration when defendant's promise to lend £
30 followed the plaintiff's earlier loan of £ 30); Barker v. Halifax, 78 Eng. Rep. 974
(K.B. 1600) (finding no consideration for defendant's promise to repay plaintiff £ 60
that plaintiff had lent to a third party at defendant's request); Wichals v. Johns, 78
Eng. Rep. 938 (K.B. 1599) (finding mutual promises are consideration for each other);
Jeremy v. Goochman, 78 Eng. Rep. 683 (K.B. 1595) (finding no consideration when
defendant's promise to pay followed the sale of plaintiff's twenty sheep); Greenleaf v.
Barker, 78 Eng. Rep. 449 (K.B. 1590) (finding that plaintiff's immediate payment of
pre-existing debt was not a sufficient consideration for plaintiff's simultaneous prom-
ise to assign a bond); Strangborough v. Warner, 74 Eng. Rep. 686 (K.B. 1589) ("[A]
promise against a promise will maintain an action upon the case, as in consideration
that you do give to me [£ 101 on such a day, I promise to give you [£ 10] such a day
after."); Kirby v. Eccles, 74 Eng. Rep. 171 (K.B. 1589) (finding that a promise to
return hogs after fattening was consideration for promise to pay for fattening ser-
vices). But see Marsh v. Kavenford, 78 Eng. Rep. 319 (K.B. 1587) (finding a father's
natural affection for his daughter and his concern for her advancement is sufficient
cause for a subsequent promise to pay her husband £ 100), reported sub nom. Marsh
v. Rainsford, 74 Eng. Rep. 400 (1588) (noting that father initially requested plaintiff
to marry his daughter but promised to pay only after marriage had taken place); Val
D. Ricks, The Sophisticated Doctrine of Consideration, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 103
(2000) ("In many assumpsit cases of that period, courts either fictionalized the consid-
eration requirement or dropped it altogether. The courts' willingness to make these
two moves shows that consideration was not at its inception a hard and fast require-
ment for recovery in assumpsit or contract.").
355. See, e.g., Riggs v. Bullingham, 78 Eng. Rep. 949 (K.B. 1599) (finding plaintiff's
grant of an advowson to the defendant many years earlier at the defendant's request
is a continuing consideration for a later promise to pay by the defendant); Pearle v.
Edwards, 74 Eng. Rep. 95 (K.B. 1588) (finding continuing occupation of leased prem-
ises was sufficient consideration for landlord's subsequent promise to hold tenant
harmless from claims of third parties); Sydenham v. Worlington, 78 Eng. Rep. 20
(K.B. 1585) (finding that to maintain assumpsit it was necessary only that "there be
any moving cause or consideration precedent, for which cause or consideration the
promise was made" and thus there was consideration for a promise to repay one who
had acted as a surety at the defendant's request).
356. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 16, at 650 ("[Firom the seventeenth century on-
wards the law relating to assumpsit is the law of contract, and, historically speaking,
that consideration which makes a contract enforceable was principally the conditions
which were necessary to maintain an action of assumpsit. This was indeed the situa-
tion by 1602 .... "); see also Ibbetson, Assumpsit and Debt, supra note 325, at 152-61
(arguing that modern understanding of contract as bargain was in place by the 1580s);
Ricks, supra note 354, at 106 ("The bargain requirement in this rough form was estab-
lished when courts rejected past consideration in 1568.").
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and that the promisor should be held to promises relied on." '35 7 These
moral underpinnings, however, were not distinctly Puritan or even
Protestant.
The history of the doctrine, of consideration, if anything, demon-
strates an inverse relationship to a Puritan emphasis on the sanctity of
promise. On the one hand, common law consideration and civil law
causa were very similar around 1540 but diverged by century's end
resulting in fewer, not more, enforceable promises. On the other
hand, once the courts had defined the parameters of consideration,
they addressed little overt concern for its adequacy until 1675 in James
v. Morgan.358 Conversely, the Westminster Larger Catechism empha-
sized the importance of promise keeping in general 359 while Puritan
theologian William Ames took pains to justify a wide variety of de-
fenses against enforcement of all promises.3 6 ° The morality of enforc-
ing bargains and even mere promises where the promisee suffered
injury cannot be correlated to Puritanism. Little direct association ex-
ists between consideration as a technique of enforcing only commer-
cial bargains and Puritan doctrine, covenantal or otherwise. The
common law courts had been moving in this direction during Henry's
day and certainly well before Puritans appeared on the scene.3 61
D. Mutuality and Independence
The decision in Paradine v. Jane362 seems most likely to bear a posi-
tive correlation to the areas of potential Puritan influence on the com-
mon law of contracts. The King's Bench decided the case in 1647, well
after the rise of Puritanism and only shortly after the doctrinal formu-
lations of the Westminster Standards.363 In Paradine,36 4 the plaintiff
landlord brought an action in debt against his tenant, who had not
paid rent for three years (roughly 1643-1646).365 The defendant en-
tered a special plea366 alleging that he had been out of possession for
virtually the entire time at issue because "Prince, Rupert an alien, and
357. TEEVEN, supra note 16, at 44.
358. James v. Morgan, 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B. 1663) (reporting first common law
case applying doctrine of unconscionability).
359. See THE LARGER CATECHISM, supra note 86, at 62.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 157-68.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 312-19.
362. See 82 Eng. Rep. 519 (K.B. 1647) (reporting by Style); 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.
1647) (reporting by Alden). For a detailed analysis of Paradine, see D.J. Ibbetson,
Fault and Absolute Liability in Pre-Modern Contract Law, 18 J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1997)
[hereinafter Ibbetson, Fault and Absolute Liability].
363. LATOURETTrE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY II, supra note 56, at 821 (observ-
ing that the Assembly completed the Confession in November 1646); see also THE
WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at 598 (showing the cover page
of the first publication of the Confession in 1647).
364. Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 519 (K.B. 1647).
365. Id.
366. Id. A special plea to an action in debt was uncommon. In most cases the
defendant was required to plead nihil debet. See, e.g., Lady Shandois v. Simson, 78
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an enemy of the King" '36 7 had invaded the land, driven away the de-
fendant's cattle, and expelled him from the land.368 The plaintiff de-
murred to this plea, and the defendant presented a number of
arguments from natural law, the law of reason, civil law, canon law,
and even "moral authors 3 6 9 for why the court should allow it.
370
Chief Justice Rolle found against the defendant on all points and
held what has come to be known as the foundation of absolute liabil-
ity in contract that "when the party by his own contract creates a duty
or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, not-
withstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might
have provided against it by his contract."' 371 The default rule was ab-
solute liability, and except for an act of God and perhaps breaches
induced by the promisee, the promisor must address any exculpatory
events in the contract; the court was not willing to employ any gener-
ous construction in aid of the tenant. Harold Berman attributes this
decision to the influence of Puritanism and its ideology of the bar-
gain.372 In fact, not surprisingly, Rolle was following English legal
scholar John Selden and ignoring Puritan theologian William Ames.373
Moreover, other factors such as the common law's historical treat-
ment of conditions and defenses as well as the desire for centralized
judicial administration must also be considered in evaluating the influ-
ence of Puritanism on the law of contracts.
Eng. Rep. 1104 (K.B. 1602); see also Francis, supra note 17, at 59 n.113 (citing Lady
Shandois, 78 Eng. Rep. 1104).
367. Paradine, 82 Eng. Rep. at 519.
368. Id.; see C. H. Firth, The Journal of Prince Rupert's Marches, 13 ENG. HIST.
REV. 729 (1898). In fact, Prince Rupert (1619-1682) was a son of King Charles's
sister by her marriage to Frederick V, the Protestant Elector of the Palatinate. Ru-
pert was the commander of the King's cavalry through much of the Civil War and saw
nothing but success from 1642-1644. After the fall of the King's last stronghold at
Oxford in 1646, Rupert left England. See Firth, supra, at 740-41. See generally KEN-
YON, supra note 38, at 154 (describing the King's problems with Rupert).
369. Paradine, 82 Eng. Rep. at 520.
370. Id.
Also by the law of reason it seems the defendant in our case ought not to be
charged with the rent, because he could not enjoy that that was let to him,
and it was no fault of his own that be [sic] could not, and the civil-law, and
the canon-law, and moral authors do confirm this ....
Id.
371. Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897 (K.B. 1647) (reporting by Alden at
26-27). Style's report does not contain this language although he quotes Rolle to the
effect that "if the tenant for years covenant to pay rent, though the lands let him be
surrounded with water, yet he is chargeable with the rent, much more here."
Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 519, 520 (K.B. 1647) (reporting by Style at 49). The
expression "if he may" as reported in Alden is reminiscent of Breverton's Case, 73
Eng. Rep. 67, 72 (K.B. 1537), which was probably intended to preserve a defense of
physical impossibility due to an act of God.
372. See BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II, supra note 17, at 340-41; Berman,
Law and Belief, supra note 304, at 603-07.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 152-169.
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1. Substantive Origins of Absolute Liability
The holding in Paradine3 74 articulated a rule of absolute liability in
contract. Yet, the common law courts for many years had reached
virtually the same conclusion in other cases.375 One of the earliest
cases dealing with the defense of supervening impossibility was an
anonymous report in 1537 where the court excused the defendant's
nonperformance of a lease covenant to "sustain" the banks of a river
which had collapsed due to a flood because the flood was an "act of
God, which cannot be resisted. "376 Yet, the tenant remained liable to
perform the second part of the lease covenant to "repair" the banks
that had collapsed "in convenient time, because of his own cove-
nant. '3 77 In other words, an act of God would relieve from liability
for breach of a covenant to maintain an impossible state of affairs but
would not be a defense to an obligation to perform a service simply
because the act of God rendered performance more burdensome.
Thus, in 1544, the King's Bench indicated that the rent due from a
tenant for land and sheep should be apportioned when all the sheep
died, apparently of natural causes.3 78 In 1566, the court in Arundell v.
Combe379 held that the death of the obligor before the date for per-
formance of a conditional bond was a good defense.38 ° Yet, nearly
twenty years later, the King's Bench held that the sinking of a ship
loaded with apples by a "great and violent tempest"3 81 was no defense
to an action in assumpsit for breach of a promise to carry the apples
from Greenwich to London.382 Even such an act of God was no de-
374. Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 519 (K.B. 1647).
375. See ST. GERMAN, supra note 342, at 184-87 (describing a regime of virtually
absolute liability of the life tenant to the reversioner for waste committed by a third
party). Rolle even picks up the following reasoning in Paradine:
As yf a man take landes for terme of lyfe and byndeth hym selfe by oblyga-
cyon that he shall leue the lande in as good case as he founde it/ yf the
houses be after blowen downe with tempest or dystroyed with straunge
enemyes... he shall forfeyte his oblygacyon in lawe and conscience by cause
it is his owne acte to bynde hym to it ....
Id. at 185.
376. Breverton's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 67, 73 (K.B. 1537). Style's report of Paradine
has Chief Justice Rolle citing this case.
377. Id.
378. Richards le Taverner's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 123 (K.B. 1544). The report states
that the facts of the case were read for the leading attorneys of the day whose opin-
ions were split although most favored no apportionment. When it was later read for
four of the justices of the King's Bench, they concluded that "the rent should be
apportioned, because there is no default in the lessee." Id. at 124. While no judgment
was noted, the conclusion is consistent with Breverton's Case, 73.Eng. Rep. 67 (K.B.
1537).
379. 73 Eng. Rep. 581 (K.B. 1566).
380. Id.
381. Taylors Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 708, 709 (K.B. 1583).
382. Id. at 708-09 (summarizing the contract only as one in which "the defendant
promised to carry certain apples for the plaintiff.. . to London," and construing their
summary of the promise to exclude excuse by even an act of God).
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fense because, according to the court, "the plaintiff had subjected,
[sic] himself to all adventures. ' 383 On the other hand, the defense of
"act of God" was applied to a situation where death prevented an
obligor from performing one of two alternatives in Tropp v. Hed-
ingfield,3 8 4 thus saving the bond. Finishing out the sixteenth century
in Laughter's Case,385 the King's Bench (or at least Edward Coke in
his report) rationalized the law in a case where one of two alternative
conditions for the forfeiture of a bond became impossible by an act of
God: "[W]here a condition of a bond consists of two parts in the dis-
junctive, and both are possible at the time of the bond made, and af-
terwards one of them becomes impossible by the act of God, the
obligor is not bound to perform the other part .... ,,386 Finally, in
1624, in Williams v. Hide,38 7 the plaintiff brought an action in assump-
sit against a gratuitous bailee for the return of a horse which had died
while in the defendant's custody.388 The defendant pleaded that the
horse had died of disease, not the bailee's negligence, to which the
plaintiff demurred. 389 The court held that the defendant's plea was
good, reasoning that an act of God, at least where it rendered per-
formance physically impossible, was as good a defense in assumpsit as
in debt.39°
By the time of Paradine,39 1 with perhaps one exception, the law
seemed clear that only a supervening physical impossibility in the
form of an act of God would constitute a defense to actions brought in
debt or assumpsit. Payment of rent by a dispossessed tenant was
clearly not physically impossible, yet a contrary holding in Paradine3 92
remained open. Three decades earlier Coke, as Chief Justice of Com-
mon Pleas, had concluded that the standard terms describing the
rental obligation for leased land, reddendo inde or reservando inde
("to be paid from that source" or "to be reserved from that source"),
contained a constructive condition to the effect that the rent due
under a lease was presumed by the parties to be taken from the profits
of the land; thus, if the lessee could not have any profits, he would not
be liable.393 Such a construction of the lease in Paradine 3 would
383. Id. at 709.
384. 78 Eng. Rep. 532, 532 (K.B. 1592).
385. 77 Eng. Rep. 82 (K.B. 1595); Eaton v. Laughter, 78 Eng. Rep. 643 (K.B. 1595).
386. Laughter's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 82-83.
387. Williams v. Hide, 81 Eng. Rep. 1214 (K.B. 1628).
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. See SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF CONTRACT, supra note 16, at 529-30 (noting the
court's conclusion that "an assumpsit is a covenant by words, and a covenant an as-
sumpsit by deed so that it was irrational to apply a different law to formal and infor-
mal contracts."). But see Arundell v. Combe, 73 Eng. Rep. 581 (K.B. 1566).
391. Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 519 (K.B. 1647).
392. Id.
393. See Clun's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1117, 1118-19 (K.B. 1613). Stating further:
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have excused the tenant;395 therefore, more than simple extension of
precedent must have been at work.
2. Procedural Reasons for Absolute Liability
The range of defenses available to defendants in contractual matters
had diminished over the course of the century preceding Paradine.3 9 6
Before assumpsit had become available to plaintiffs in contracts cases
in the sixteenth century, the only substantive issue in an action for
debt was whether the obligation existed; the defendant's fault was im-
material.397 Conversely, in the early centuries of assumpsit, the issue
was "whether the defendant had in fact wrongfully breached the obli-
gation" to the plaintiff.398 Contractual liability was, therefore, "strict"
in the sense that the defendant's negligence was no defense, although
acts of God and third parties (particularly the plaintiff) might succeed.
The defendant's fault was at issue in assumpsit cases through the con-
cept of fault.3 99 When assumpsit and particularly indebitatus assump-
sit invaded the realm formerly and solely occupied by debt, the courts
were faced with a choice: Should the debt-based regime of strict liabil-
ity or the tort-like presuppositions of assumpsit be applied to contract
cases heard under a delictual writ? By 1573, Mountford v. Catesby4 ° °
provided the definitive answer. In many ways, Mountford4°1 was the
opposite of Paradine:402 A tenant brought an action in assumpsit
against his landlord for breach of the covenant in the lease providing
for quiet enjoyment of the leasehold.4 °3 The Common Pleas denied
the landlord's motion in arrest of judgment and held even the entry by
a person against whom the tenant could bring an independent action
The third reason was, because the rent reserved is to be raised out of the
profits of the land, and is not due until the profits are taken by the lessee: for
these words reddendo inde, or reservando inde, is as much as to sa[y], that
the lessee shall pay so much of the issues and profits at such days to the
lessor ....
Id.
394. Paradine, 82 Eng. Rep. at 519.
395. See id. at 520. Unfortunately, neither report of Paradine quotes from the lease
so its actual terms remain unknown. However, the tenant's counsel cited Clun's Case,
77 Eng. Rep. at 1117, and Rolle did not distinguish it on its facts. Rolle simply passed
over the invitation for a favorable construction.
396. Paradine, 82 Eng. Rep. at 519.
397. See Ibbetson, Fault and Absolute Liability, supra note 362, at 4-6 (describing
fourteenth and fifteenth century understandings of "contract" and "tort").
398. Id. at 6.
399. See id. at 2.
400. 73 Eng. Rep. 741 (K.B. 1573).
401. Id.
402. See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 519 (K.B. 1647).
403. See Mountford, 73 Eng. Rep. at 741 (stating that the lease expressly provided
that the tenant would "during the term [be] without eviction and interruption of any
person"; furthermore, the facts pleaded (and presumably found by the jury) were that
the father of the landlord had entered the premises and interrupted the plaintiff's
enjoyment).
2005]
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW
for trespass breached the defendant's "express assumption" of quiet
enjoyment.4" Regardless of the defendant's fault and independent of
any other rights of the plaintiff, breach of a specific undertaking was
actionable in assumpsit.4 °5
Clinton Francis provides an extensive explanation of the reasons for
the emphasis of the common law courts on strict interpretation of con-
tractual conditions. Francis observes three facts about sixteenth and
seventeenth century judicial administration. First,
In the second half of the sixteenth century, the common law courts
faced a substantial increase in the volume of litigation. Between
1560 and 1580 litigation increased more than fourfold in the King's
Bench and as much as tenfold in the Common Pleas, and by 1606
both courts had nearly doubled the 1580 figures. After 1606, vol-
ume continued to grow steadily.4°6
Second, notwithstanding the massive increase in the caseload of the
royal courts, the benches of Common Pleas and King's Bench re-
mained at five judges each.4 °7 Last, the nisi prius system of local jury
trials over which one of the royal judges presided when not sitting en
banc at Westminster was proving unworkable:
The tremendous growth in common law litigation overloaded nisi
prius calendars. Increased difficulty in empanelling juries com-
pounded the problem. In addition, the jurors' low level of compre-
hension and the notoriously corrupt practices at nisi prius gave jury
trials a reputation as the weakest link in the common law
system....
"[A]t this period few nisi prius hearings detained the court for
more than twenty minutes."'' 8
These facts forced the courts to adopt a form of case administration
that, on the one hand, permitted the courts to maintain a centralized
(and profitable)40 9 monopoly over the judicial system while, on the
other hand, permitted the tightly controlled delegation of fact-finding
and decision-making to the local jury.410 The courts implemented
404. Id.
405. See Ibbetson, Fault and Absolute Liability, supra note 362, at 16 ("Whatever
the position in the absence of an express term, if such a term did exist the courts
would interpret it strictly and give effect to its literal meaning.").
406. Francis, supra note 17, at 41-42.
407. Id. at 50 (pointing out that increasing the number of judges on the bench
would not have expedited case administration because they sat en banc).
408. Id. at 63-64 (quoting J. COCKBURN, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH ASSIZES
1558-1714, at 137-38 (1972)).
409. Id. at 44-47 (discussing vested economic interests of the judges in maintaining
control over cases "for which litigants were prepared to pay, and pay dearly").
410. See id. at 56. Francis states:
By confining litigation to a single issue, the procedural rules guiding the
form of the issue operated against the implementation of standards and
against any scheme for adjusting competing damage claims. The substantive
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their strategy by limiting the trial to a single issue of fact and by devel-
oping a substantive law of conditions that simplified the jury's
work.411 The movement to strict and then absolute liability in debt
and then indebitatus assumpsit cases is consistent with the courts' ef-
forts to delegate and control:
[I]n cases involving oral contracts the terms of the agreement[s]
were outside the court's cognizance .... [T]he early seventeenth-
century courts ... retreated by encouraging the use of a notion of
mutual promises and independency. The old rule of dependency
was thus replaced by what amounted to a general rule of
independency.412
Seen in this light, the decision in Paradine413 to treat the covenant
to pay rent as unaltered by the actions of a third party (other than
God) 4 1 4 is consistent with the long standing administrative practice of
the common law courts. The desire of the King's Bench to avoid con-
ducting unnecessary nisi prius trials during the unstable period of the
Civil War could also have been a factor. While the court could have
preserved its delegation-control strategy by allowing counsel to form a
single issue of fact on the question of whether Prince Rupert's occupa-
tion caused a failure of the constructive condition that the tenant has
received profits from the land,415 both substantive precedent and judi-
cial convenience favored the outcome of absolute liability in
Paradine.416 Yet, the proximity of the decision to the results of the
Westminster Assembly and the theological leanings of the judge mean
that the possibility of an alternate conclusion should not be ignored.
3. The Role of Rolle
Not surprisingly, the Civil War severely disrupted the administra-
tion of justice in England. For four years, there were no nisi prius
trials because no judges of Common Pleas or the King's Bench were
able to travel to the assizes.4 17 As the parliamentary cause prevailed,
law rules controlling the content of pleading.., produced a law of condi-
tions that worked a simple all-or-nothing loss allocation between the parties.
Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 60.
413. Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 519 (K.B. 1647).
414. See id. at 520.
415. See supra text accompanying note 393.
416. Paradine, 82 Eng. Rep. at 519. The technique of simultaneous judicial delega-
tion and control in the face of burgeoning litigation was also at work in Hadley v.
Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). See RICHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY
PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER READINGS ON WELL-KNOWN CASES 93-95
(1978) (discussing inability of fifteen judges in 1854 to review the massive number of
decisions of newly created County Courts and implementation of the technique of
"crystallized delineation of [jury] instructions" to maintain control).
417. See INDERWICK, supra note 66, at 153 ("From the autumn of 1642 to the au-
tumn of 1646 no judges went the circuits .... ").
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in 1646 Parliament appointed some judges, including Henry Rolle (ca.
1589-1656), whose decision was reported in Paradine.418 Only in 1648
did Parliament appoint a full roster of judges to the three common law
courts, and it made Rolle Chief Justice of the King's Bench.419 Given
the remaining political uncertainty of the time, Rolle insisted that the
Rump Parliament42 ° declare that the new judges were to follow the
"fundamental laws" of England under the new civil administration
before opening court.421
Henry Rolle was born in to a substantial family in Devonshire and
admitted to the bar in 1618 after studying several years at Exeter Col-
lege, Oxford and entering the Inner Temple in 1609.422 He became a
serjeant in 1640.423 Rolle served as a member of parliament during
the last three parliaments of James I and the first three of Charles.424
He supported the parliamentary party in its opposition to the expan-
sion of the royal prerogative. 425 Although Rolle refused a seat in the
Long Parliament,426 he consistently supported the parliamentary
cause during the 1640s.427 In 1643, Rolle subscribed to the Solemn
League and Covenant 428 by which he undertook to cause "the refor-
mation of religion" in England according to "the example of the best
418. Paradine, 82 Eng. Rep. at 519; see also INDERWICK, supra note 66, at 153-54
("In the autumn of 1646, some judges were appointed by Parliament and some went
their circuits; amongst other, Justice Rolle .... ").
419. INDERWICK, supra note 66, at 154 ("In the autumn of 1648, more Judges were
appointed. Rolle was made Chief Justice of the King's Bench .... ).
420. The so-called "Rump Parliament" was the roughly 250 members of the 1642
elected Long Parliament who remained after the army's expulsion in 1648 of those
who did not support abolition of the monarchy. See generally DAVID UNDERDOWN,
PRIDE'S PURGE: POLITICS IN THE PURITAN REVOLUTION (1971).
421. See INDERWICK, supra note 66, at 156 ("The chiefs with their puisnes refused
to go into Court and open Hilary Term until the House had duly read and passed a
declaration settled by themselves that the fundamental laws of the country should be
continued .... ").
422. See BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 152, at 450-51.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.; see also G. A. Harrison, Innovation and Precedent: A Procedural Reap-
praisal of the 1625 Parliament, 102 ENG. HIST. REV. 31, 49 (1987).
426. 2 LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 78
(Jersey City, Fred D. Linn & Co. 1881).
427. See SMITH, supra note 153, at 162 ("On the outbreak of the civil war [Rolle]
adhered to the parliament, contributed 100... to the defence fund, and took the
covenant.").
428. Id. Parliament adopted the Solemn League and Covenant in 1643 to obtain
Scottish assistance against the King in the Civil War. See Acts & Ords. Interregnum,
supra note 125, at 175-76 (containing the Act of June 9, 1643, which notes "[t]he
Covenant to be taken by the whole Kingdom"). Individual subscription was enjoined
on all citizens of England and was a prerequisite for office service in the parliamen-
tary cause. See Acts & Ords. Interregnum, supra note 125, at 298 (containing the Act
of September 20, 1643, "Declaration, That no one shall have any Command under the
Parliament, till he has taken the Covenant"); id. at 376-78 (containing the Act of
February 5, 1644, "An Ordinance, enjoyning [sic] the taking of the late Solemn
League and Covenant, throughout the Kingdom of England and Dominion of
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reformed Churches. 4 29 According to nineteenth century historian
John Campbell, Rolle "conscientiously approved of the reforms intro-
duced both into the church and the state."43 In 1648, Rolle agreed to
serve on the first Council of State of the Commonwealth to which the
Rump Parliament had "confided the entire executive authority." '431
Yet, in 1649, he refused to serve on the High Court of Justice that
tried and convicted Charles I of treason.432 Rolle's commitment to
the common law as received never wavered. F.A. Inderwick credits
Rolle with preserving the common law in the face of republican and
even revolutionary demands for change:
[Ilt is, I think, mainly to Chief Justice Rolle and the good influence
he exercised over Cromwell... that we owe the preservation of our
old laws which some persons . . .were only too anxious to erase
from our Statute Book as relics of feudalism and barbarity.433
Inderwick also highlights Rolle's Puritan sympathies when he writes
that Rolle "from his earliest days to his latest, was a firm and consis-
tent member of the Puritan party. 434
Rolle's Puritan theological convictions, coupled with his support of
the common law, not only led him to oppose law reform but ulti-
mately brought about his resignation as Chief Justice of the Upper
Bench (as the King's Bench was known during the Protectorate). 435
Rolle was captured and briefly held by royalist insurrectionists during
Wales."). The Solemn League and Covenant provided for the establishment of Re-
formed doctrine and a presbyterian form of church government. Id. at 175.
429. Acrs & ORDS. INTERREGNUM, supra note 125 (containing The Solemn League
and Covenant).
430. See CAMPBELL, supra note 426, at 78.
431. Perez Zagorin, The Social Interpretation of the English Revolution, 19 J. ECON.
HIsT. 376, 383-84 (1959); see also CAMPBELL, supra note 426, at 81 (discussing Rolle's
service in the Council of State).
432. See William L. Sachse, England's "Black Tribunal": An Analysis of the Regi-
cide Court, 12 J. BRIT. STUD. 69, 71 (1973) (stating that an earlier act of Parliament
had provided for the three presiding chief judges of the common law courts (Henry
Rolle (King's Bench), Oliver St. John (Common Pleas), and John Wilde (Exchequer))
to sit on the special court to try the King, however, "the three jurists were in complete
agreement as to the illegality of the project, and made it clear that they would have
nothing to do with it"); see also CAMPBELL, supra note 426, at 80 ("Rolle had long
been kept ignorant of the determination to bring the King to an open trial. Highly
disapproving of this proceeding, he refused not only to preside at it, but to allow his
name to be introduced into the ordinance for creating the High Court of Justice.").
433. INDERWICK, supra note 66, at 161. For a more nuanced view of the failure of
the efforts for law reform during the Commonwealth and Protectorate, see VEALL,
supra note 46, Mary Cottrell, Interregnum Law Reform: The Hale Commission of
1652, 83 ENG. HIST. REV. 689 (1968), Barbara Shapiro, Codification of the Laws in
Seventeenth Century England, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 428, 455, and Barbara Shapiro, Law
Reform in Seventeenth Century England, 19 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 280 (1975).
434. INDERWICK, supra note 66, at 161-62.
435. Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J.
1855, 2126 (1985) ("'The upper bench,' what the Court of King's Bench was called
between the execution of Charles I (1649) and the restoration of Charles 11 (1660)
. . ' .
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Penruddock's Uprising at the Salisbury Assizes on March 12, 1655.436
Despite Cromwell's order to try the insurgents himself, Rolle re-
fused.43 7 Rolle next came into conflict with Cromwell over the impo-
sition of taxes without parliamentary authorization4 38 and finally
resigned after receiving abuse and threats from Cromwell
personally. a39
Rolle's apparent commitment to Puritan doctrine and social prac-
tice, coupled with the political uncertainties of his day, help explain
the path he chose in Paradine.440 On the one hand, the trend toward
absolute liability in all types of contract cases was already well estab-
fished; yet, Rolle could have construed a condition to relieve Jane of
his obligation to pay during the occupation of the land. Rolle would
have remained consistent with the use of conditions to speed resolu-
tion of contract cases either way, although use of express rather than a
constructive condition was simpler. On the other hand, the ongoing
Civil War would only have accelerated the pressures toward central-
ized judicial administration and toward reliance on express rather
than constructive terms. The discipline of enforced promise keeping
that was consistent with the Puritan doctrine of "perfect and personal
obedience" associated with the Covenant of Works was reproduced at
the judicial level. 44a The mercy associated with the Covenant of Grace
was not. Either approach would have been consistent with precedent
and the needs of administration. And while either would have been
consistent with Puritan teaching exemplified by the Westminster Stan-
dards, Paradine 442 was out of accord with William Ames's conclusions
about the requirements of Christian conscience. The uncertain po-
litical situation of Paradine 444 and perhaps the uncompromising posi-
tion taken by John Selden 445 are the keys to the choice made by Rolle.
Rolle's decision in Paradine4 6 can best be understood as exemplifying
the need for strict enforcement of all obligations-religious, civil, and
436. See Unton Crocke, Cromwell and the Insurrection of 1655 (pt. 2), 4 ENG. HIST.
REV. 313, 325-26 (1889) (discussing seizure of Salisbury during uprising).
437. See BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 152, at 450; CAMPBELL, supra
note 426, at 88 (quoting Rolle to the effect that "he was unfit to give judgment in this
case, wherein he might be considered a party concerned").
438. See Cony's Case, 5 Howell's State Trials 935, 936-37 (1816).
439. See CAMPBELL, supra note 426, at 89 (discussing confrontation with Cromwell
over Cony's Case, concluding that Rolle "thought it very necessary for his own dignity
that he should withdraw").
440. Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 519 (K.B. 1647).
441. See THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 133, at 617.
442. Paradine, 82 Eng. Rep. at 519-20.
443. See supra text accompanying notes 157-168.
444. Paradine, 82 Eng. Rep. at 519-20.
445. See supra text accompanying note 152.
446. Paradine, 82 Eng. Rep. at 519-20.
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economic-during a time of systemic cultural and political
uncertainty.447
V. CONCLUSION
The argument for a strong influence of Puritanism and the English
Revolution on the law of contracts appears overextended. While
there can be no question that the common law of contracts underwent
significant development over the century preceding the execution of
Charles I and while one can hardly question that there was an English
Revolution448 and while the congruence between aspects of Puritan
theology and the development of the common law of contracts cannot
be ignored, it is, nonetheless, the case that the changes in the law of
contracts were neither sufficiently swift nor comprehensive nor rooted
in the distinctiveness of Puritan theology to be considered "Revolu-
tionary." The series of changes to the common law of contracts from
the early rise of assumpsit and extending even to the doctrine of abso-
lute liability were deeply grounded in the English common law, free
markets, and the modality of contractual social ordering. Capitalism
generally and contracts specifically were consistent with the Puritan
self-understanding as the elect who were free to keep God's law, but
neither was so associated with Puritanism as to represent a causal rela-
tionship in either direction.
However, a generalized or weak relationship between the English
Reformation, capitalism, and contracting appears warranted. Relig-
ious changes from Henry's Act of Supremacy, to the dissolution of the
monasteries, to the Elizabethan Settlement, to Laudian uniformity,
447. This is not to say that Jane had no recourse. He could have brought an inde-
pendent action against Paradine for breach of any warranty of quiet enjoyment. See
Mountford v. Catesby, 73 Eng. Rep. 741 (K.B. 1573); see also Thorps Case, 82 Eng.
Rep. 418 (K.B. 1639) ("[I]f there were a breach upon the part of the defendant, it is
sufficient [for the plaintiff to allege breach without also alleging that the plaintiff was
prepared to perform his promise], and if there was a breach on the plaintiffs [sic] part,
the defendant ought to bring his action fo[r] it."). The court further noted that their
rejection of what today would be called the doctrine of constructive conditions would
not apply where the defendant's promise was "conditional." Presumably they meant
expressly conditional.
448. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, I, supra note 17, at 3 (positing the exis-
tence of a series of six "Great Revolutions" (of which the culmination of the protes-
tant reformation in England is one) as the explanatory paradigm for Western history).
A "Revolution" (with an upper-case "R") is "a fundamental change, a rapid change, a
violent change, a lasting change, in the political and social system of a society, involv-
ing a fundamental change in the people themselves-in their attitudes, in their char-
acter, in their belief system." Id. To constitute a "Revolution," cultural change must
be (relatively) swift and comprehensive. Wars and even civil wars are commonplace
and thereby do not qualify as Revolutions even when they result in a change of gov-
ernment. The culmination of the English reformation qualifies as a Revolution be-
cause, according to Berman, the changes it caused were certainly violent and
permanently reached the whole of English society, extending to its substantive private
law including the law of contracts. See id. at 3, 337-41.
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and to the Civil War were inextricably intertwined with continuing ju-
dicial recognition of a need for a generalized form of contractual rem-
edy. Concomitant social changes represented by urbanization,
commercialization, and industrialization as well as political dynamics
from the Tudor-Stuart expansion of the prerogative to parliamentary-
Puritan reaction to the execution of Charles I cannot be understood
without reference to the conflicts within and between a protestantized
majority and a Puritan minority in England.
